F5 F5CAB5 Dumps Questions Answers

To successfully performSSL offload and re-encryptionon a BIG-IP system, the virtual server must be configured withboth a Client SSL profile and a Server SSL profile. The Client SSL profile enables BIG-IP to decrypt inbound HTTPS traffic from clients, while the Server SSL profile is required tore-encrypt traffic before forwarding it to the pool members.

From the exhibit, the virtual server has aClient SSL profile configured, which allows BIG-IP to accept HTTPS connections from clients. However, there isno Server SSL profile attached, meaning BIG-IP attempts to sendunencrypted HTTP trafficto pool members listening on HTTPS (port 443). This protocol mismatch causes the server-side SSL handshake to fail, resulting in users being unable to connect to the application.

This behavior is well documented in BIG-IP SSL troubleshooting guides: when backend servers expect HTTPS, a Server SSL profile is mandatory to establish a secure connection from BIG-IP to the pool members.

The other options are incorrect:

Removing the Client SSL profile (Option A) would break client-side HTTPS.

The server-side TCP profile (Option B) is unrelated to SSL encryption.

Forward Proxy (Option C) is only used for outbound SSL inspection scenarios.

Therefore, configuring anSSL Profile (Server)is the correct and required solution.

Troubleshooting SSL connection resets often involves verifying license limits against actual resource utilization. F5 devices use a "Transactions Per Second" (TPS) license to control the amount of SSL processing the device can handle. The log entry SSL transaction (TPS) rate limit reached is a clear indicator that the traffic volume has exceeded the licensed capacity. When determining the necessary license level, it is important to know that F5 primarily licenses and limits the "Client-side" SSL TPS—which represents the encrypted connections between the users and the virtual servers. In this specific scenario, the peak demand reached 1200 client-side transactions per second. Although there were also 800 server-side transactions (re-encryption from the BIG-IP to the pool), these typically do not count against the primary TPS license limit in the same manner. Therefore, to ensure that the virtual server works as expected during peak load, the administrator must upgrade the license to at least 1200 TPS. This troubleshooting process links system log errors to license-enforced resource constraints.

The pool member is markedDOWNbecause it is monitored bymultiple health monitors, specifically anHTTPmonitor and anHTTP/2monitor. The status message clearly shows that theHTTP monitor is UP, while theHTTP/2 monitor is DOWN. In BIG-IP, when multiple monitors are assigned to a pool member, the default behavior isAND logic, meaningall assigned monitors must succeedfor the pool member to be considered healthy.

In this scenario, the server is responding successfully to standard HTTP (likely HTTP/1.1) requests but does not support or respond correctly to HTTP/2 requests. As a result, the HTTP/2 monitor fails, which causes the overall monitor status to beDOWN, even though HTTP traffic itself is working.

This behavior is expected and documented in BIG-IP monitoring logic. Unless the monitor rule is explicitly changed to“at least one of”, a single failing monitor will mark the pool member down. Therefore, the correct conclusion is that the pool member isonly serving HTTP traffic, not HTTP/2.

The resolution would be to either remove the HTTP/2 monitor, correct the application to support HTTP/2, or adjust the monitor rule to match the intended health-check logic.