CAMS Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) Questions and Answers

One of the central pillars of the EU AML Package adopted in June 2024 is theEU AML Regulation. This regulation introduces directly applicable AML/CFT rules across all EU member states, replacing the previous approach where AML directives were transposed into national laws. This shift addresses regulatory fragmentation and strengthens enforcement across borders.

The complete AML Package includes the following four pillars:

EU AML Regulation (directly applicable rulebook)

6th AML Directive (not the 7th)

Establishment of a new EU Anti-Money Laundering Authority (AMLA)

Revised Transfer of Funds Regulation, especially concerning crypto-asset service providers

The EU AML Regulation aims to unify and streamline the application of AML/CFT measures across the EU, ensuring a consistent and effective framework.

Section 319(a) of the USA PATRIOT Actenhancesregulatory oversight of foreign financial institutions with U.S. correspondent accounts.

Option A (Correct):This section requires foreign banks to provide relevant AML records within 120 hours upon request from a U.S. regulatory agency.

Option B (Incorrect):This describes Section 311, which deals with special measures against foreign jurisdictions or financial institutions.

Option C (Incorrect):This is covered under Section 319(b), which permits asset seizures from U.S. correspondent accounts.

Option D (Incorrect):This relates to Section 312, which mandates due diligence on foreign correspondent accounts and private banking.

Best Practices for Compliance with Section 319(a):

Ensure the ability to produce AML-related records within 120 hours.

Establish clear communication channels between correspondent banks.

Monitor foreign financial institution relationships for compliance risks.

AML compliancemust be balanced with data protection lawssuch asGDPR (EU), CCPA (U.S.), and local banking secrecy laws.

Option B (Correct):Data minimization ensures financial institutions only collect and retain essential customer dataneeded for AML compliance.

Option C (Correct):Regularly updating data processing policies ensures compliance with evolving data protection regulations.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option A (Incorrect):Unrestricted access to customer data increases privacy risksand canviolate GDPR and other data protection laws.

Option D (Incorrect):AML data must not be repurposed without regulatory justification, asGDPR requires data usage to align with its original collection purpose.

Best Practices for Managing Data Privacy in AML Compliance:

Restrict access to AML data on a need-to-know basis.

Implement strong encryption and security controls for customer data.

Ensure all AML-related data collection aligns with privacy regulations.

According to the Third European Union Money Laundering Directive (3rd AMLD), a politically exposed person (PEP) is an individual who is or has been entrusted with prominent public functions, such as heads of state, government ministers, judges, senior military officers, or members of parliament1. The 3rd AMLD requires institutions and persons covered by the Directive to apply enhanced customer due diligence measures when dealing with PEPs residing in another Member State or in a third country, in order to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing risks1. The 3rd AMLD also specifies that a person who is no longerentrusted with a prominent public function shall not be considered a PEP after a period of at least one year has elapsed since that person left office, unless the institution or person covered by the Directive has knowledge or reason to believe that the person is still exposed to specific risks2. However, the Commission Directive 2006/70/EC, which lays down implementing measures for the 3rd AMLD, extends this period to at least two years, and allows Member States to extend it further, depending on the level of risk and the type of prominent public function involved3.

"Transaction Monitoring Systems and Ongoing Monitoring: Since the transactional monitoring system is key to mitigating ML risk within the bank, the Committee recognizes that AML risks require more than just appropriate policies and procedures; banks must have adequate and appropriate monitoring systems. For most banks, this will involve an IT monitoring system. If the bank does not believe it needs an IT monitoring system, it should document the rationale for why it does not need one.

 the specialist should inform the bank’s senior legal advisor of the situation and seek guidance on how to handle the legal request and the internal memos. The specialistshould not take any action that could compromise the integrity of the legal request, the bank’s anti-money laundering program, or the specialist’s own professional obligations. The specialist should not place the memos in his personal files, as this could be seen as hiding or tampering with evidence. The specialist should not ask the bank president to document his instructions, as this could create a conflict of interest or a perception of undue influence. The specialist should not call the law enforcement agent and suggest he modify the legal request, as this could be seen as interfering with the investigation or tipping off the account holder.

According to the ACAMS CAMS Study Guide, one of the methods that attorneys may use to facilitate money laundering is to make payments to third parties on behalf of their clients, using funds from their client accounts. This may obscure the source and destination of the funds, and create a false appearance of legitimate transactions. Therefore, making payment to various people is a red flag for potential money laundering in this situation.

 A free-look provision is a period of time, typically 10 to 30 days, in which a new life insurance policy owner can terminate the policy and have their premium refunded1. This can help criminals to launder money by purchasing a policy with illicit funds and then cancelling it within the free-look period to receive a clean check from the insurance company2. This way, they can disguise the source and origin of their funds and avoid any penalties or charges that would otherwise apply to early termination of the policy.

TheEU AMLD provides the legal framework, butmember states have discretionin implementation.

Option B (Correct):Countries canimpose stricter AML lawsthan theminimum EU requirements.

Option C (Correct):AMLDsset the foundation, and member statesimplement local laws.

Option A (Incorrect):EU law takes precedence, and national lawsmust alignwith it.

Option D (Incorrect):AMLDs and local AML regulations areinterlinked.

Option E (Incorrect):National AML rules do not have to be identicalacross all EU members.

shell banks are banks that have no physical presence in any country and are not affiliated with any regulated financial institution. They are often used by money launderers and terrorist financiers to hide their illicit activities and evade regulatory oversight. The USA PATRIOT Act prohibits US financial institutions from opening or maintaining correspondent accounts with shell banks, and requires them to take reasonable steps to ensure that their foreign correspondent banks do not provide services to shell banks12. Therefore, the US does not have jurisdiction over shell banks operating in foreign jurisdictions, unless they are involved in transactions that violate US laws or sanctions.

Section 319(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act allows U.S. authorities to seize funds from correspondent accounts held by foreign banks in the U.S.

Option A (Correct):Section 319(b) grants the U.S. government authority to seize assets in U.S. correspondent bank accounts belonging to foreign financial institutions involved in illicit activities.

Option B (Incorrect):Section 314(b) facilitates voluntary information sharing among financial institutions but does not authorize asset seizure.

Option C (Incorrect):Section 314(a) relates to law enforcement requests for financial intelligence, not asset seizures.

Option D (Incorrect):Section 319(a) concerns record-keeping requirements for foreign banks but does not authorize asset seizures.

Best Practices for Foreign Banks with U.S. Correspondent Accounts:

Ensure full AML compliance to avoid regulatory scrutiny.

Avoid processing high-risk transactions that may trigger U.S. jurisdiction.

Monitor cross-border transactions to detect potential financial crime exposure.

In situations involving significant AML concerns, especially with high-risk clients, thecompliance officer must follow proper escalation procedureswithin the institution. The appropriate course of action is toescalate the matter to a senior governance body, such as ahigh-risk client committee, which is typically tasked with balancing AML risk against business considerations.

Unilateral offboarding (Option B)may violate internal protocols.

Persuading the relationship manager (Option C)bypasses formal governance.

Delaying action (Option D)risks further exposure to regulatory or reputational damage.

This escalation ensuresdocumented risk-based decision-makingand demonstrates to regulators that the institution appliesstructured and objective AML governance.

AML risk assessments must beupdatedwhen there aresignificant changes in business operations.

Option A (Correct):New products (e.g.,cryptocurrency services, trade finance) introducenew AML risks.

Option D (Correct):Technology changes(e.g.,AI in transaction monitoring, new digital banking platforms) impactfraud and AML controls.

Option E (Correct):Mergers or acquisitionsintroducenew customer bases, jurisdictions, and compliance frameworks, requiringrisk reevaluation.

Option B (Incorrect):While compliance restructuring is important,it does not change inherent risk exposure.

Option C (Incorrect):Management changesmay affect oversight, but they donot directly alter risk exposure.

A robust AML training program should incorporate the followingbest practicesto ensure awareness and ongoing engagement:

Option A – Tailored and regular training:

Training should berisk-based and role-specific, ensuring employees understand how AML applies to their function.

Option D – Variety and resources:

Use ofinteractive, digital, live, and scenario-based methodskeeps training effective and adaptable. Providing materials and resources supports continued learning.

Option E – Communication and measurement:

Ongoing AML awareness campaigns andfeedback mechanismshelp assess theeffectivenessof training and reinforce its importance.

Option Bis too vague and not recognized as a best practice.

Option C, while helpful, isnot sufficient alone—annual frequency without contextual or tailored content is inadequate.

Regulatory exams assess whether financial institutions comply with AML/CFT laws and have adequately addressed previous deficiencies.

Option C (Correct):Regulators may still issue remediation orders if the bank's improvements do not fully resolve prior AML compliance gaps.

Option D (Correct):If deficiencies persist, regulators may impose civil or criminal penalties.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option A (Incorrect):Secondary sanctions typically apply to institutions violating international sanctions laws, not AML program deficiencies.

Option B (Incorrect):Regulatory orders are not always confidential—major enforcement actions may be publicly disclosed.

Option E (Incorrect):Boards are responsible for AML oversight but are not always required to disclose corrective actions publicly.

Best Practices for Addressing AML Exam Findings:

Document all remediation efforts with clear implementation timelines.

Demonstrate a culture of compliance through leadership and training.

Ensure sustained improvements, not just short-term fixes.

Human trafficking and modern slaveryinvolveillicit financial transactions, often conductedthrough banks, money service businesses (MSBs), or virtual assets.

Option B (Correct):Frequent payments for online advertisementscan indicaterecruitment for illicit labor or traffickingoperations.

Option C (Correct):Incoming funds from third-party processors with unclear originatorssuggestconcealed financial flows linked to illicit activities.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option A (Incorrect):Transactional activity with a virtual currency exchange alone is not a strong human trafficking red flag.

Option D (Incorrect):Cash payments to workers could indicate labor law violations but do not necessarily indicate human trafficking.

Common Financial Red Flags for Human Trafficking:

Unexplained cash deposits and withdrawals from multiple accounts.

Frequent wire transfers to high-risk jurisdictions.

Use of prepaid cards to move funds anonymously.

Best Practices for Detecting & Preventing Human Trafficking-Related Transactions:

Train frontline staff to recognize financial indicators of trafficking.

Monitor unusual transaction patterns in industries with high labor exploitation risks.

File Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) when trafficking-related transactions are suspected.

ARisk-Based Approach (RBA)allows financial institutions toallocate compliance resources effectivelyandprioritize higher-risk areasforenhanced due diligence (EDD).

Option A (Correct):An RBA enables institutions to tailor their AML controls based on risk exposure, ensuring better resource allocation.

Option B (Incorrect):While RBAimproves efficiency, itdoes not guarantee faster implementationof controls.

Option C (Incorrect):RBA is a regulatory requirement, butit is not necessarily determined by customer acceptance.

Option D (Incorrect):RBA provides guidance on risk mitigation, but itdoes not dictate specific resource usage.

Benefits of a Risk-Based Approach (RBA):

Efficient use of compliance resourcesby focusing onhigh-risk transactions, customers, and geographies.

Regulatory compliance alignmentwithFATF, Basel Committee, and Wolfsberg Group AML principles.

Flexibility to adjust AML controlsas new threats emerge.

Best Practices for Implementing RBA in AML Compliance:

Conduct enterprise-wide risk assessments (EWRAs).

Classify customers and transactions based on risk levels.

Apply enhanced due diligence (EDD) for high-risk clients.

Art and Antiquities: Conduits for Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing

Why Fight the Antiquities Trade?

More recently, groups like Daesh (Islamic State [IS]), al-Qaida, the Taliban and their affiliates have been engaged in ****cultural racketeering and terrorism in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and elsewhere, converting patrimony into cash for weapons and troops****.

https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm17427.doc.htm

As Terrorists Diversify Fundraising Tactics, Greater Efforts Needed to Shut Down Illicit Channels, Secretary-General Tells Finance Ministers’ Meeting

Terrorists continue to adapt their tactics and diversify their funding sources. Today, Da’esh runs a multi-million-dollar economy in territories under its control. Da’esh terrorists raise money through the oil trade, extortion, undetected cash couriers, kidnapping for ransom, trafficking of humans and arms and racketeering. They loot and sell precious cultural property, shamelessly profiting from the destruction of humanity’s common heritage.

 Having inadequate privacy policies and procedures can expose an organization to legal risks such as industry or regulatory sanctions and charges of deceptive business practices. Industry or regulatory sanctions can result from violating the laws and regulations that govern data privacy and protection, such as the GDPR, the CCPA, or the GLBA.These sanctions can include fines, penalties, injunctions, or revocation of licenses. Charges of deceptive business practices can arise from misleading or false statements about how the organization collects, uses, or discloses personal data, or from failing to comply with its own privacy policies and procedures. These charges can lead to lawsuits, settlements, or enforcement actions by authorities such as the FTC or the state attorneys general.

it describes a reason why trusts established in certain offshore jurisdictions make good vehicles to layer money, which is names of the settlor and beneficiaries are not publicly available. This means that the true owners and controllers of the funds or assets held by the trust are hidden from the public and the authorities, and can only be accessed by the trustee or the protector, who may be complicit or unaware of the money laundering scheme. This creates a high level of anonymity and secrecy for the money launderers, who can use the trust to move, disguise, or conceal the origin and destination of their illicit funds.

The other options are not necessarily reasons why trusts established in certain offshore jurisdictions make good vehicles to layer money, although they may have some advantages or disadvantages depending on the circumstances and the risk profile of the customers and countries involved. Option B describes a possible motive for setting up a trust in an offshore jurisdiction, which is to minimize taxes, but this does not imply that the trust is used to layer money, as there may be legitimate tax planning or optimization purposes. Option C describes a possible challenge or obstacle for setting up a trust in an offshore jurisdiction, which is offshore jurisdictions are unfamiliar with trust, but this does not imply that the trust is used to layer money, as there may be other legal or financial vehicles available in those jurisdictions. Option D describes a possible characteristic or feature of a trust, which is trusts may hold assets of significant size, but this does not imply that the trust is used to layer money, as there may be valid reasons or sources for the large assets.

 the internal investigation did not examine the brokerage account, which could be a potential source of money laundering. According to the CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, one of the common methods of money laundering is to use securities brokers to move funds through the purchase and sale of stocks, bonds, or other instruments1. The customer’s frequent transfers from the business account to the brokerage account, and the increased volume of activity in the business account, could indicate that the customer is trying to disguise the origin or ownership of illicit funds by investing them in money market securities. Therefore, the anti-money laundering specialist should recommend the internal investigator to concentrate on the trades made in the brokerage account, and to look for any signs of market manipulation, insider trading, or unusual patterns of transactions1.

A bank employee who willfully violates anti-money laundering laws faces the risk of criminal investigation and imprisonment, as these are serious offenses that could result in felony charges and penalties. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, individuals who knowingly violate the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) or other anti-money laundering laws could face up to 10 years in prison and/or a fine of up to $500,0001. Similarly, in other jurisdictions, such as the UK, Canada, and Australia,individuals who commit money laundering offenses could face imprisonment and/or fines234.

According to the ACAMS CAMS Certification Video Training Course1, one of the red flags for money laundering is “transferring funds to or from foreign countries or jurisdictions that are known to have weak anti-money laundering standards or are considered high-risk for money laundering or terrorist financing” (Module 2, Lesson 3, Part 2). This is also consistent with the suspicious activity report (SAR) criteria, which require financial institutions to report transactions that “involve funds derived from illegal activity or are intended or conducted to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activity” or “involve the use of the financial institution to facilitate criminal activity” (31 CFR § 1020.320(a)(2)). Therefore, the customer’s request to transfer funds to accounts in three different foreign jurisdictions should be the focus of the SAR, as it may indicate an attempt to launder money or finance terrorism.

 A U.S. bank must block or reject an international funds transfer when there is an OFAC designated party to the transaction, regardless of the beneficiary or the correspondent bank. This is because the U.S. bank is prohibited from dealing with any person or entity that is on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List) or subject to any other OFAC sanctions program1. The SDN List includes individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers, that are designated under programs that are not country-specific2. The U.S. bank must also report any blocked or rejected transactions to OFAC within 10 business days3.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, one of the essential elements of an effective AML program is the establishment of a written AML policy that setsout the bank’s commitment to comply with the applicable AML laws and regulations, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors, senior management, and staff in implementing the AML program. The AML policy should also include the bank’s risk assessment, customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, record keeping, reporting, training, and audit procedures. The AML policy should be approved by the board of directors and communicated to all staff from the top down. The other options are not incorrect, but they are not the primary responsibility of the board of directors in demonstrating commitment to AML compliance.

TheUSA PATRIOT Actincludes provisions allowingthe U.S. government to seize assets linked to financial crime, even when held in foreign financial institutions.

Option A (Correct):Section 319(a) of the USA PATRIOT Actprovides U.S. regulators with the authority toseize funds deposited in U.S. correspondent accounts of foreign banks if linked to illicit activity.

Option B (Incorrect):Section 314(a)focuses oninformation sharing between law enforcement and financial institutions.

Option C (Incorrect):Section 319(b)enables U.S. authorities toseize funds linked to foreign correspondent banking accounts, but319(a) specifically deals with extraterritorial forfeiture.

Option D (Incorrect):Section 314(b)allowsfinancial institutions to voluntarily share AML-related information.

Why This Matters:

Foreign banks using U.S. correspondent accounts can be subject to U.S. jurisdiction.

Helps U.S. law enforcement disrupt global money laundering networks.

Encourages financial institutions to enhance correspondent banking due diligence.

According to the guidance issued by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the federal banking agencies, a financial institution is legally permitted to discuss any aspects of the reported activity with the law enforcement officer who contacts them about the suspicious transaction report (SAR), as long as the officer provides appropriate credentials and a written request for the information. The financialinstitution is also legally permitted to send the deposit documents referenced in the SAR, as they are part of the supporting documentation that may be requested by law enforcement1

However, the financial institution is not legally permitted to provide copies of the customer’s loan documents or explain the customer’s loan payment history, as they are not directly related to the reported activity and may contain confidential information that is protected by privacy laws or contractual agreements. The financial institution should only disclose the minimum amount of information necessary to respond to the law enforcement request and should not volunteer any information that is not relevant or requested12

When an existing customer becomes a politically exposed person (PEP), the KYC analyst should perform enhanced due diligence (EDD) for that customer. EDD involves gathering additional information about the customer, assessing the risk associated with their PEP status, and updating the KYC profile accordingly. The goal is to ensure compliance with regulations, verify customer identities, and mitigate the higher risk posed by PEPs. Regular monitoring and updates during the review/refresh period are essential to stay informed about any changes in the customer’s status or risk profile1.

Financial institutions closely monitor customer accounts for suspicious activity related to money laundering, terrorist financing, or other illicit activities. If an account consistently triggers multiple suspicious activity reports (SARs), it raises red flags. These reports indicate unusual or potentially illegal transactions, such as large cash deposits, frequent transfers to high-risk jurisdictions, or patterns inconsistent with the customer’s profile. To mitigate risk and comply with anti-money laundering (AML) regulations, the financial institution may decide to close the account. Regular SAR filings are essential for maintaining the integrity of the financial system and preventing illicit financial flows12.

SAR information ishighly sensitive, and institutionsmust follow strict confidentiality rulesto protect investigations and avoid “tipping off” customers.

Option D (Correct):Statistical summaries (e.g., the number of SARs filed, trends, typologies)help the Board monitor AML riskswithout disclosing confidential details.

Option A (Incorrect):Providingall possible detailsmay violateSAR confidentiality laws.

Option B (Incorrect):Sharing full SAR copieswith non-compliance staff isnot permittedunder AML regulations.

Option C (Incorrect):Naming specific customers under SAR reviewrisks"tipping off"or leaking confidential information.

Best Practices for SAR Reporting to the Board:

Provide anonymized statistics on SAR trends.

Highlight emerging AML risks and compliance effectiveness.

Avoid disclosing specific cases or customer names.

Financial institutions must conduct thorough background checks on employees in sensitive roles (e.g., private banking) to mitigate fraud, insider trading, and money laundering risks.

Option A (Correct):Past employment records help verify work history and identify any red flags related to prior financial misconduct.

Option D (Correct):Internet and media searches reveal any negative press, regulatory issues, or connections to illicit activity.

Option E (Correct):Criminal history searches help screen for prior convictions related to financial crimes.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option B (Incorrect):Personal references are less reliable and may not uncover objective risk factors.

Option C (Incorrect):A resume is self-reported and should be verified using independent sources.

Best Practices for Employee Background Screening:

Conduct enhanced due diligence for high-risk roles (e.g., private bankers, compliance officers).

Use reliable background screening tools and legal databases.

Verify employment history and check against regulatory blacklists.

 According to the ACAMS CAMS Certification Study Guide (6th edition), one of the red flags for money laundering is the transfer of large sums of money to or from high-risk jurisdictions, especially if the transactions are inconsistent with the customer’s profile or business activity. Large payments to a beneficiary in a high-risk jurisdiction may indicate that the originator is involved in illicit activities such as tax evasion, fraud, corruption, or terrorism financing. Therefore, such payments should be escalated for further investigation and reporting1

The FATF Regional Style Bodies (FSRBs) are autonomous regional organizations that help the FATFimplement its global AML/CFT policy, which revolves around its 40 Recommendations, in over 200 affiliated countries1. One of the key characteristics of the FSRBs is that they emphasize regional co-operation between member countries, as stated in the High-Level Principles and Objectives approved by the FATF Plenary in October 20122. This means that the FSRBs facilitate information exchange, technical assistance, training, and mutual support among their members to enhance their AML/CFT capacities and compliance. The FSRBs also promote regional perspectives and specificities in the FATF policy-making process and foster dialogue and collaboration with other regional and international bodies2.

Private investment companies (PICs) are potentially vulnerable to money laundering due to the difficulty in identifying the ultimate beneficial owners. PICs are often used to hold and manage private wealth, making them attractive targets for money launderers. Since these entities are privately held and not publicly traded, it can be challenging to identify the individuals who ultimately control or benefit from them. This makes it easier for money launderers to use them to disguise the origins of illicit funds.

When considering sharing information across the institution or within the same jurisdiction, the key legal issue that poses challenges to sharing customer-related information is data protection and privacy laws. Data protection and privacy laws exist in most countries and can vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These laws place restrictions on how customer data can be used, shared, and stored, and can limit the ability of financial institutions to share customer-related information with each other. Additionally, these laws may also require financial institutions to take additional steps to ensure the protection of customer data.

The Egmont Group assists financial intelligence unit members to accomplish their goals by providing support to expand and systematize cooperation related to the reciprocal exchange of information, fostering better and secure communication through the application of technology, and encouraging operational autonomy of financial intelligence units. Additionally, the Egmont Group also maintains uniform global formats for funds transfers that assist in the detection of money laundering and supplies information on the common money laundering tactics used by terrorists and financial supporters of terrorism.

Microstructuring is a method of money laundering that involves breaking down large transactions into smaller amounts that are below the reporting threshold or the level of scrutiny of financial institutions. One of the red flags of microstructuring is frequent visits to make cash deposits of nominal amounts, as this may indicate an attempt to avoid detection and conceal the source or destination of illicit funds. Other red flags of microstructuring include checking accounts receiving cash deposits in amounts under $1,000 as infrequently as several times a month, followed by ATM withdrawals in foreign countries, or deposits that are inconsistent with the customer’s profile or business activity.

 The Board of Directors is the primary governing body of a financial institution and has the fiduciary duty to oversee and approve the BSA/AML compliance program. One of the key responsibilities of the Board is to ensure the appointment of a qualified chief AML officer who has the authority, expertise, and resources to implement and manage the BSA/AML program effectively. The chief AML officer is accountable to the Board and senior management for the performance of the BSA/AML program and should report regularly on the status, issues, and challenges of the program. The Board should also evaluate the chief AML officer’s performance and provide feedback and guidance as needed.

 Antiques are a potential tool for money laundering because they can be used to conceal, move, and convert illicit funds. Antiques can be of high value and often easily transported across borders, making them attractive for criminals who want to evade detection and reporting. Antiques can also be difficult to value and authenticate, creating a lack of transparency and accountability in the market. Criminals can exploit this to inflate or deflate the prices of antiques, or to use them as collateral for loans or other transactions. Antiques can also be used to layer or integrate illicit funds into the legitimate economy, by selling them through auction houses, dealers, or online platforms.

The main objective when a financial institution (FI) conducts an investigation is to track the movement of the money. Money laundering is a process of disguising the proceeds of criminal activity to make them appear legitimate. The movement of money is an essential element in the process of money laundering. Therefore, tracking the movement of funds is a crucial step in identifying and preventing money laundering. A financial institution must be able to recognize suspicious transactions and report them to the relevant authorities. An investigation is conducted to gather evidence and establish a clear understanding of the transaction flow, the parties involved, and the nature of the activity. This information is used to determine if the transaction is suspicious and if it violates any laws or regulations.

While keeping policies and procedures updated, keeping documentation, and knowing the customer are essential components of a comprehensive anti-money laundering (AML) program, these activities are not the primary objective of an investigation. Policies and procedures need to be updated to reflect changes in regulatory requirements and emerging money laundering risks. Documentation must be retained to provide evidence of the investigation process and outcomes. Knowing the customer is essential to identify and verify the customer’s identity and assess the risk associated with the relationship.

The primary purposes of Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-Style Regional Bodies are to promote effective implementation of FATF recommendations and to provide expertise and input in FATF policy-making. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 180)

Broker-dealers cannot have correspondent accounts with a foreign bank that does not have a physical presence in any country. The USA PATRIOT Act has an extraterritorial effect in that it prohibits broker-dealers from having correspondent accounts with foreign banks that do not have a physical presence in any country. This rule is designed to help prevent money laundering and terrorist financing by making it more difficult for funds to be moved to or through jurisdictions with less stringent anti-money laundering laws.

 The most appropriate step for an AML compliance officer to take upon receiving notice of government update including the names of the latest terrorists sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council is to update the monitoring software containing sanctioned persons. This is because the AML compliance officer is responsible for ensuring that the financial institution does not engage in any transactions or business relationships with individuals or entities that are subject to sanctions, as this could expose the institution to legal, regulatory, and reputational risks. By updating the monitoring software, the AML compliance officer can ensure that the institution’s screening and filtering systems are up to date and can flag any potential matches or hits with the sanctioned persons. This would also enable the AML compliance officer to take appropriate actions, such as blocking or freezing funds, reporting to the relevant authorities, and conducting further due diligence, if necessary.

 Conducting small cash transactions at multiple locations during the same day is the strongest example of avoiding reporting thresholds. This is a common technique used by money launderers to evade the attention of financial institutions and regulators, who are required to report cash transactions above a certain amount (usually $10,000) to the authorities. By splitting the large sum of money into smaller amounts and depositing them at different branches or ATMs, the money launderer can avoid triggering the reporting requirement and conceal the source and destination of the funds. This practice is also known as smurfing or structuring12.

The most suspicious transaction indicators related to casino activities are:

A client requests a winnings check (cheque) in a third party’s name. This could indicate an attempt to conceal the source or ownership of the funds, or to evade reporting requirements.

Acquaintances bet against each other in even-money games and it appears they are intentionally losing to one of the parties. This could indicate a scheme to launder money through the casino by transferring funds from one party to another without attracting attention.

A client requests the transfer of winnings to the bank account of a third party in a country without an effective anti-money laundering regime. This could indicate an attempt to move funds to a high-risk jurisdiction or to a person or entity that is involved in illicit activities.

The option that is not suspicious is:

A new client who is a large volume player asks the casino operator about the ability to transfer the funds to other locations in the same country. This could be a legitimate inquiry from a high-net-worth individual who travels frequently and wants to access their funds conveniently.

Here is the exact information from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for Trust and Company Service Providers:

"Understanding the management and ownership structure of a trust is crucial in assessing the ML/TF risk it poses. This includes the identity of all settlors, trustees and beneficiaries, and their respective roles and responsibilities, as well as the nature and purpose of the trust."

"TCSPs should obtain and maintain up-to-date information on the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship, the source of funds and wealth, and where relevant, the source of funds or wealth of the settlor and beneficiaries."

Based on this information, the correct answers are A and D. Trust and Company Service Providers must understand the responsibility and authority in the structure, as well as the general purpose behind the structure in order to assess the overall risk of the trust and ensure that any transactions with the trust are legitimate.

According to the CAMS manual 6th edition, the USA PATRIOT Act allows the US government to subpoena documents from foreign financial institutions (FIs) that have no presence in the US (option B). The manual states that "The USA PATRIOT Act provides US law enforcement agencies with the power to subpoena documents from foreign banks that maintain correspondent accounts with US banks or have no presence in the United States" (p. 77).

According to the ACAMS CAMS Study Guide (the 6th edition), one of the key steps in conducting an effective investigation of a potential money laundering or terrorist financing activity is to gather all relevant information about the customer and the transaction, including the nature and purpose of the account, the source and destination of funds,the expected account activity, and the customer’s risk profile1. In this case, the compliance officer should meet with the staff who opened the new account for the public official to obtain this information and assess whether the account is consistent with the customer’s profile and needs, or whether it indicates a possible attempt to conceal or launder illicit funds. Waiting for the new account to receive funds, calling the competent authorities, or calling the official’s office are not appropriate actions at this stage, as they may compromise the investigation, alert the customer, or violate confidentiality rules1.

 The anti-money laundering officer (AML officer) is responsible for overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of the anti-money laundering (AML) program of a financial institution. The AML officer should have sufficient authority, independence, and access to resources to perform this role. Reporting to the Sales Director may compromise the independence and objectivity of the AML officer, as the Sales Director may have conflicting interests or incentives that could influence the AML officer’s decisions or actions. The AML officer should report to a senior management level that is independent of business functions and has direct access to the board of directors or a relevant committee. This would ensure that the AML officer can communicate any AML issues orconcerns to the board without any interference or undue influence from the business functions.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision identified four risks to banking institutions as a result of an inadequate KYC program: legal, reputational, operational, and concentration. Legal risks include the potential for fines or sanctions for non-compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Reputational risks include the loss of customer confidence due to the institution's involvement in illicit activities. Operational risks include the potential for fraudulent or suspicious activity to go undetected. Finally, concentration risks involve the potential for a single customer or group of related customers to dominate the institution's operations.

The compliance officer should recommend an audit for cash transactions since the last compliance review, as this would help to identify the extent of the problem, the root causes, and the potential risks involved. The audit would also provide evidence for corrective actions and remedial measures to prevent future occurrences of non-compliance. The compliance officer should not recommend terminating or suspending the teller’s employment, as this would be premature and disproportionate without a thorough investigation and due process. The compliance officer should not recommend formally reprimanding the branch manager, as this would not address the underlying issues and could create a hostile work environment.

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) Sixth Edition manual, the AML compliance officer should inform senior leadership and the board of the investigation (page 124) and monitor the progress of the investigation by keeping clear records (page 127). Additionally, the AML compliance officer should provide all information to the FIU as soon as possible to avoid delays (page 126).

According to the CAMS Manual, when a financial institution is being investigated by the financial intelligence unit (FIU), the AML compliance officer should inform senior leadership and the board of the investigation and monitor the progress of the investigation by keeping clear records. The manual states:

"The AML compliance officer should inform senior leadership and the board of any investigations and then monitor the progress of the investigation by keeping clear records of what has been requested and submitted, deadlines and extensions granted, and any findings or reports received. This will allow the financial institution to respond effectively and efficiently to the investigation and take appropriate action if necessary." (CAMS Manual, Section 7.4.1 - Financial Intelligence Units, p. 366)

The board of directors or designated specialized committee should be provided with statistical data regarding SARs/STRs filed during the reported period, such as the number, type, value, and geographic distribution of the reports, as well as any trends or patterns identified. This information helps the board or committee to oversee the effectiveness of the firm’s AML program, assess the level of compliance risk, and allocate appropriate resources and training. Providing all possible details, names of customers, or copies of SARs/STRs may compromise the confidentiality of the reports, violate data protection laws, or expose the firm to legal liability.

When presented with a search warrant, the AML specialist should record the names and affiliations of the agents who conduct the search. This will help in identifying who conducted the search in case there are any issues that need to be addressed later. Additionally, the AML specialist should obtain a copy of the warrant or photocopy the original warrant. This is important to ensure that the warrant is valid and that the agents are authorized to conduct the search. It is not appropriate to ask the agents questions or remember what items they have seized, as this could interfere with the search and potentially lead to legal issues. Finally, leaving the premises to allow the agents to conduct the search is not necessary, as the AML specialist has the right to be present during the search.

The most important risk factor in this scenario is the proposed offshore jurisdiction that is known for its strong privacy laws limiting access to customer information by law enforcement. This indicates that the customer may be trying to evade tax, hide the source or destination of funds, or engage in other illicit activities that could expose the bank to money laundering or terrorist financing risks. Offshore jurisdictions are often used by criminals to create complex corporate structures that obscure the beneficial ownership and control of the entities involved. The bank should conduct enhanced due diligence on the customer, the offshore company, and the nature and purpose of the transactions.

The principles of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FILLs) aimed at maximizing cooperation between FILLs to more effectively combat money laundering are[1]:

B. Information exchange should take place informally, without too many formal prerequisites. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 55)

E. It is within an FlU's authority to sign Memorandums of Understanding independently. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 56)

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) study guide, 6th edition, page 105, the correct answer is C. It can be difficult to determine if there is negative media associated with counterparties solely from the customer's account activity and KYC file.

The study guide explains that negative media can include news articles, government sanctions lists, and other sources of public information that may indicate that a counterparty is involved in illicit activities. However, this information may not be readily available in a customer's account activity or KYC file, and may require additional research or investigation.

The individual responsible for setting the anti-money laundering software parameters should recommend ensuring that the alert parameters are based on risk, rather than on default software rules. This means that the software should be configured to generate alerts only when transactions or customers exhibit a high level of risk, based on factors such as the source and destination of funds, the amount and frequency of transactions, the type and purpose of the account, the customer profile and behavior, and the presence of any red flags or indicators of money laundering or terrorist financing. By aligning the alert parameters with the risk assessment of the financial institution, the software can reduce the number of false positives and focus on the most relevant and suspicious cases, thus improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the anti-money laundering staff.

The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) is a global network of FIUs that facilitates and promotes the exchange of information, knowledge, and cooperation among its members to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes1. The Egmont Group has developed operational guidance for international cooperation and information exchange among FIUs, which includes channels, procedures, and forms for making and receiving requests2. Filing a request under Egmont guidelines is therefore a common and effective way for a regulatory body to obtain international assistance in a money laundering inquiry, as it ensures that the request is made throughthe appropriate and secure channel, and that it meets the standards and expectations of the requested FIU.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces economic sanctions programs [1][2], which are designed to protect US national security, foreign policy, and economic interests. Transactions that would otherwise be prohibited can be allowed through an OFAC licensing process, in which the OFAC evaluates the request to determine that the transaction does not undermine US policy objectives.

A. Promoting the record-keeping obligations of banks to the maximum amount of data necessary for the purposes of AML investigations: "The Fifth AML Directive emphasizes that record-keeping obligations of banks must extend to the maximum amount of data necessary for the purposes of anti-money laundering investigations" (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, page 79).

C. Extending AML rules to entities that provide virtual currency services: "The 5AMLD expands the scope of the EU’s anti-money laundering rules to include virtual currency exchange platforms and custodian wallet providers" (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, page 80).

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According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision standards, the following statements best describe sound practices in relation to customer due diligence (CDD) policies and procedures:

Banks should take into consideration the occasional banking transaction or the size/level of assets to build an understanding of the customer’s profile and behavior. This is because the nature and frequency of transactions and the size of the account balance may indicate the level of risk associated with the customer and the need for ongoing monitoring1

Banks should develop and implement clear acceptance policies and procedures to identify the types of customer that are likely to pose a higher risk of financing terrorism or money laundering. This is because banks should not enter into or maintain relationships with customers who pose unacceptable risks to the bank or the financial system. Banks should also apply a risk-based approach to CDD and apply more stringent measures to higher-risk customers12

Banks should implement enhanced due diligence measures for entering business relationships with high-risk customers, such as approval by senior management. This is because banks should ensure that they have adequate information and controls to manage the risks posed by such customers and to comply with the relevant laws and regulations. Senior management should be involved in the decision-making process and be accountable for the outcomes12

The risk-based approach (RBA) is an essential foundation of the FATF Recommendations, as it allows countries, competent authorities and financial institutions to adopt a more flexible set of measures to target their resources more effectively and apply preventive measures that are commensurate to the nature of risks, in order to focus their efforts in the most effective way. The RBA is not optional, but a prerequisite for the effective implementation of the FATF Standards. The RBA requires the identification, assessment and understanding of the ML/TF risks to which the countries and FIs are exposed, and the implementation of AML/CFT measures that are proportionate and tailored to those risks. The RBA is not a “zero failure” approach, but a way to mitigate the risks in the most efficient and effective manner.

Internet gambling is an ideal web-based money laundering method because it allows criminals to move funds across borders quickly, anonymously, and with minimal oversight12. Internet gambling sites can facilitate the placement, layering, and integration stages of money laundering by accepting cash deposits, issuing virtual credits, allowing bets on various games, and paying out winnings through different payment methods12. Internet gambling also poses challenges for law enforcement and regulators, as it operates in a complex and dynamic environment that involves multiple jurisdictions, service providers, and technologies12.

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) Manual , 6th edition, if a bank's transaction surveillance system triggers an alert for a deposit of 250.000 USD into a client's account, the bank should take the following actions:

Request information and documentation from the client on the background of the transaction (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 46).

Contact the client advisor to learn if he has any insight on the transaction background (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 47).

Review the transaction background in the bank's transaction platform (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 47).

Discarding the alert as a false positive hit and reviewing the alert if the deposit is made in cash should not be done.

The bank should request additional information and documentation from the client to better understand the nature of the transaction. Additionally, the bank should reach out to the client advisor to learn if they have any insight on the transaction background. Finally, the bank should review the transaction background in the bank's transaction platform to determine if any additional alerts or anomalies are present. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Pages 117-118)

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is a global standard-setting body for the prudential regulation of banks. It does not have any formal authority to enforce its standards, but relies on its members’ commitment and peer pressure to implement them. The BCBS’s principles on customer due diligence (CDD) are part of its guidelines on anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT), which aim to enhance the soundness and integrity of banking systems. The BCBS’s principles on CDD provide guidance to banks and bank supervisors on the essential elements of a CDD programme, such as customer acceptance, identification, verification, risk assessment, monitoring, and record-keeping. The BCBS’s principles on CDD are not legally binding, but are intended to be a benchmark for national practices and for banks to design their own policies and procedures. The BCBS’s principles on CDD are consistent with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global standard-setter for AML/CFT.

According to the 6th edition Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist Study Guide, when the compliance department receives an internal referral that appears to indicate terrorist financing, the first step in the investigation process should be to gather background and transaction information. This includes obtaining customer identification and verifying customer data, obtaining additional information about the customer and the transaction, and reviewing thetransaction activity. This information will help to determine if the referral is accurate and if further action is needed.

The compliance officer should evaluate the request, determine whether it is valid, and provide the necessary information, subject to management approval. It is important to follow the bank's policies and procedures for responding to law enforcement requests, including verifying the authenticity of the request and the identity of the officer making the request. Additionally, it is important to protect customer privacy and ensure that sensitive information is not released to unauthorized individuals. (Reference: Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Chapter 6)

A risk-based compliance program is one that identifies and prioritizes the highest compliance risks to the FI and implements controls, policies and procedures to mitigate them. A data-based option is the most suitable for a risk-based compliance program, as it allows the FI to collect, analyze and monitor relevant data on its customers, transactions, products, services, geographies and other risk factors. A data-based option also enables the FI to measure the effectiveness of its compliance program and adjust it as needed to respond to changing risks and regulatory expectations12.

Retail banks typically have a high inherent risk of money laundering due to their provision of cash services. This is because cash is a preferred medium of exchange for criminals and terrorists, and retail banks provide a convenient way for them to move large sums of money without detection. Retail banks are also vulnerable to money laundering through the use of false identities and other deceptive practices. (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 8).

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (CAMS) Manual[1], 6th edition, financial entities that violate Anti-Money Laundering (AML) laws can face several reputational risks such as loss of high-profile customers, seizure of assets, increased audit costs to monitor behavior, and monetary penalties. For example, the US Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) imposes civil money penalties on "persons who willfully violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause any violation of any provision of the Bank Secrecy Act or its implementing regulations." (CAMS Manual, 6th edition, page 26).

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a regulation issued by the European Union (EU) that sets out requirements for the processing and protection of personal data. It applies to any company that processes personal data of individuals in the EU, and requires organizations to take appropriate measures to protect the personal data of individuals, such as implementing appropriate security measures, limiting the amount of data collected and stored, and providing clear explanations of how the data will be used. In the context of financial crime investigations, the GDPR requires organizations to ensure the security and confidentiality of personal data that they collect and process, and to take measures to ensure that the data is used only for the purpose of the investigation and not for any other purpose.

According to the CAMS Study Guide, one of the methods to launder money using TCSPs is to create a complex web of transactions involving multiple entities and jurisdictions, often using shell companies and nominees. The payment of consultancy fees to unrelated companies and service providers established in a foreign jurisdiction could be a sign of such a scheme, as it could be used to disguise the origin and destination of illicit funds, or to evade taxes and regulations. Therefore, this transaction indicator warrants further escalation to the compliance officer.

This includes civil monetary penalties, criminal prosecution, and other enforcement actions. These penalties can be enforced against foreign individuals, regardless of whether the individual is located within the US or abroad. Additionally, OFAC has the authority to impose sanctions on foreign countries and foreign individuals, including individuals and entities located outside of the US.

According to the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition), Section 2.2.5 Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Requirements, a Suspicious Activity Report (SAR) filing is required when a financial institution is aware of, or suspects, a possible violation of law or regulation, or any other suspicious activity related to money laundering, terrorist financing, or other unlawful activity. In this case, Answer A would require a Suspicious Activity Report filing as the deposits are made on a daily basis without providing a legitimate purpose.

According to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network's (FinCEN) guidance, one example of a suspicious transaction is "frequent deposits of cash or monetary instruments in amounts under $10,000 to the same account, or a pattern of such deposits, unless the financial institution has a reasonable explanation for the pattern." (CAMS Manual, 6th Edition, Page 209)

C. FSRBs play an essential role in identifying and addressing AML technical assistance needs for their individual member countries. The FSRBs are responsible for promoting the effective implementation of the FATF Recommendations at the regional level, including by assisting member countries in identifying technical assistance needs and facilitating the provision of such assistance.

D. FATF and FSRBs are free-standing organizations that share the common goals of combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and proliferation. The FATF is an intergovernmental body that sets global standards for AML/CFT and promotes their effective implementation, while the FSRBs are regional organizations that work to promote the effective implementation of the FATF Recommendations at the regional level.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, one of the red flags for money laundering in real estate transactions is the use of an appraiser who is not on the approved list of the financial institution. This could indicate a possible collusion between the appraiser and the borrower or the underwriter to inflate the value of the property and obtain a higher loan amount. The anti-money laundering specialist should document the underwriter’s actions and the reasons for approving the exception, as well as the discrepancy between the appraised value and the market value of the property. The specialist should then file a suspicious transaction report (STR) to the relevant authorities, as required by the local regulations .

Senior management bears the ultimate responsibility for approving a financial institution's relationship with a politically exposed person (PEP). The institution must ensure that appropriate measures are taken to manage the risks associated with a PEP, including conducting enhanced due diligence and applying appropriate mitigating measures. The relationship manager and the OKYC analyst may identify the risks associated with the PEP and recommend mitigating measures, but it is ultimately the responsibility of senior management to approve the relationship and ensure that the appropriate measures are taken. The enhanced due diligence compliance officer is responsible for ensuring that all due diligence requirements are met.

Export and import restrictions are sanctions imposed by countries to limit or prevent the import or export of certain goods and services. Export and import restrictions are typically used in order to protect a country's economic or political interests, or to prevent the proliferation of weapons or other dangerous materials. Export and import restrictions are often the first type of sanctions used in order to avoid escalating violent conflicts and/or proliferation of weapons. Examples of export and import restrictions include embargoes, quotas, or tariffs.

 The FATF conducts peer reviews of each member on an ongoing basis to assess levels of implementation of the FATF Recommendations, providing an in-depth description and analysis of each country’s system for preventing criminal abuse of the financial system. The FATF Methodology for assessing compliance with the FATF Recommendations and the effectiveness of AML/CFT systems sets out the evaluation process. Assessments focus on two areas, effectiveness and technical compliance. The effectiveness component will assess whether the AML/CFT systems are working, and the extent to which the country is achieving the defined set of outcomes. The technical compliance component will assess whether the necessary laws, regulations or other required measures are in force and effect, and whether the supporting AML/CFT institutional framework is in place.

When assessing and managing money laundering risks while operating in foreign jurisdictions different from that of the head office, an effective AML monitoring program should conform to the foreign jurisdiction policies to align with the head office policies. This ensures that the organization's AML/CFT risk management remains consistent across all jurisdictions, while allowing local compliance staff to assess and manage the risks specific to their jurisdiction. Additionally, the program should be tailored to the higher of standards between the jurisdictions, and should be consistent with the head office audits. Providing all foreign jurisdiction reports to the head office for approval is not necessary, as long as the program is consistent with the head office policies.

In accordance with Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards [1][2], when the minimum AML requirements of the host country where a financial institution (Fl) operates are less strict than those of the Fl's home country, the Fl is required to ensure that their branches and majority-owned subsidiaries in host countries implement the requirements of the home country, to the extent that host country laws and regulations permit. This means that the Fl should not impose more strict requirements on host country branches, disregarding if host country laws and regulation permit such action, and should not close down its operations in the host countrieswhere minimum AML requirements are less strict than those of the home country. However, the Fl should always apply additional measures on their branches and majority-owned subsidiaries in host countries to manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risk overseas.

According to the research report by the Council of Europe1, one of the typologies of money laundering through online gambling is the use of multiple accounts and identities to conceal the source and destination of funds. This can be done by opening several accounts under the same name using different IP addresses, or by using false or stolen identification documents to create multiple accounts. Another typology is the use of online gambling platforms that are not regulated or authorized by the jurisdiction where the customer is located, or that do not require know-your-client information from users. This can allow money launderers to access the online gambling services from multiple countries, without being subject to any verification or monitoring by the authorities.

 According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a financial institution must take certain steps to fulfill its customer due diligence (CDD) obligations [1][2]. These steps include verifying the customer's identity, understanding the customer's business, and assessing the customer's risk profile. Additionally, the financial institution must verify that the customer is not on any sanction lists, such as the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals list. This step is important to ensure that the financial institution is not doing business with any individuals or entities that are subject to economic sanctions. Other steps include obtaining information on the intended nature of the banking relationship, securing a written declaration from the customer confirmingthe source of the funds, and identifying shareholders listed on the stock exchange of corporate entities holding fifty percent of the shares.

The activity described in the question raises several red flags for money laundering, such as large and frequent cash deposits, transfers to offshore jurisdictions, and involvement of a charitable organization that could be a front for illicit funds. The Compliance Officer should file a suspicious transaction report (STR) with the competent authority, such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), as soon as possible, and provide all the relevant information and documentation to support the suspicion. Filing an STR is a legal obligation for financial institutions and does not require the consent or notification of the customer. The Compliance Officer should also follow the bank’s internal policies and procedures for handling such cases, which may include freezing the account, conducting further investigation, or escalating the matter to senior management.

A Penza scheme, also known as a Ponzi scheme, is a form of fraud that lures investors and pays profits to earlier investors with funds from more recent investors1 The scheme relies on attracting new investors with unrealistic promises of high returns and low risk, while using their money to pay off the previous investors2 An unlicensed investment advisor who offers profits other investments cannot guarantee is likely to be involved in a Penza scheme, as this is a common way to entice unsuspecting victims3 The other options are not necessarily indicative of a Penza scheme, as they could be legitimate or involve other types of fraud.

The activity of a teller distributing bank brochures to customers who regularly conduct cash transactions below reporting limits warrants further review. This is because the teller may be facilitating or encouraging structuring, which is a form of money laundering that involves breaking down large amounts of cash into smaller transactions to avoid detection or reporting requirements. Structuring is illegal and can expose the institution and the employee to civil or criminal penalties. The teller may also be acting as an agent or a recruiter for money launderers who use the bank’s services to launder their illicit funds12.

The most important consideration when deciding whether to recommend closing the account is the requests from the competent authority, such as the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the regulator, or the law enforcement. According to the FAQs related to Suspicious Transaction Reporting issued by theFinancial Monitoring Unit of Pakistan1, reporting entities should not terminate the relationship with the customer after filing a STR, unless instructed by the competent authority. This is because closing the account may alert the customer of the STR, compromise the investigation, or hinder the collection of further evidence. Therefore, the reporting entity should consult with the competent authority before taking any action to close the account.

The other options are less important or irrelevant considerations. The institution’s anti-money laundering policy may provide some guidance on how to handle high-risk customers or accounts, but it should not override the requests from the competent authority. Customer relations and the Chief Executive’s reputational risk are not valid reasons to keep the account open if there is evidence of money laundering or terrorist financing. The reporting entity should act in accordance with the law and the best interests of the public, not the personal or business interests of the customer or the bank’s management.

According to the FATF Recommendations, the competent authority that should directly receive suspicious or unusual transaction reports is the financial intelligence unit (FIU). The FIU is a central, national agency responsible for receiving, analyzing and disseminating information related to money laundering and terrorist financing. The FIU should have operational independence and autonomy, and should be able to exchange information with other domestic and foreign authorities. The FIU should also provide feedback to the reporting entities on the use and value of their reports.

According to the Wolfsberg Principles on Private Banking, the bank should apply additional diligence to customers who present a higher risk of money laundering or other financial crimes. Some of the indicators for defining such customers are:

Persons residing in or having funds from countries with inadequate AML standards, sanctions, embargoes, or other measures that indicate a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing12.

Persons engaged in business activities known to be susceptible to money laundering, such as cash-intensive businesses, gambling, arms trade, precious metals and stones, art and antiquities, etc13.

Persons determined to be Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs), who are individuals who hold or have held positions of public trust or influence, or their family members or close associates, and who may pose a higher risk of corruption, bribery, or abuse of power14.

Persons who receive funds from a correspondent banking relationship are not necessarily required additional diligence, unless they fall under any of the above categories or other risk factors. Correspondent banking is a service provided by one bank to another bank to facilitate cross-border transactions, and it is subject to its own set of AML standards and due diligence measures5.

Accountants can be involved in money laundering schemes in various ways, either knowingly or unknowingly. Some of the common methods that accountants can use to launder money are:

Overstating income to hide excess cash: This method involves inflating the revenues or profits of a business to conceal the origin of illicit funds. For example, an accountant can create fake invoices or receipts to justify the deposit of cash from illegal sources into the business account. This can make the cash appear as legitimate income from the business operations.

Acting as a conduit for transferring cash between accounts: This method involves using the accountant’s own account or a third-party account to move funds around and obscure the audit trail. For example, an accountant can receive cash from a client and deposit it into their own account, then transfer it to another account or withdraw it in a different location. This can make it difficult to trace the source and destination of the funds.

Acting as a designee for someone who wishes to hide their identity: This method involves using the accountant’s name or credentials to open accounts or conduct transactions on behalf of a client who wants to remain anonymous. For example, an accountant can act as a nominee director or shareholder for a shell company that is used to launder money. This can make it appear as if the accountant is the owner or beneficiary of the funds, while the actual owner or beneficiary is hidden.

 The correct answer is B, because it describes a method of money laundering known as structuring or smurfing. This is when a customer or a group of customers break down large amounts of illicit funds into smaller transactions that are below the reporting threshold, and then send them to another customer or entity, often in another country. This way, they avoid triggering any suspicion or regulatory reporting by the bureau de change or money services business (MSB) that processes the wire transfers. Structuring or smurfing is a common technique used by money launderers to move funds across borders and disguise their origin and destination.

The other options are not necessarily indicative of money laundering, although they may require further investigation depending on the circumstances and the risk profile of the customers and countries involved. Option A describes a regular and small wire transfer that may be legitimate, such as a remittance to a family member or a friend. Option Cdescribes a large volume of wire transfers that may be related to a seasonal or business activity, such as a holiday or a trade event. Option D describes a series of small wire transfers that may be coincidental or random, and do not necessarily add up to a significant amount.

The FATF communicates its findings regardingjurisdictions with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies by issuing two formal documents three times per year, namely the FATF Public Statement and the Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process document1. These documents identify the jurisdictions that have serious and/or systemic deficiencies in their AML/CFT regimes and the progress they have made in addressing them. The FATF also calls on its members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures or enhanced due diligence measures to protect the international financial system from the risks emanating from these jurisdictions1.

Institutions that violate anti-money laundering laws may face various risks and consequences, such as legal, regulatory, reputational, and operational risks. As demonstrated by the 2012 HSBC settlement with United States authorities, two of the most significant risks are:

Forfeiture of assets. This means that the institution may have to surrender some or all of its assets that are related to the money laundering activities or violations. For example, HSBC agreed to forfeit $1.256 billion as part of its deferred prosecution agreement with the US Department of Justice1.

Civil money penalties. This means that the institution may have to pay fines or penalties to the government or other regulatory agencies for violating the anti-money laundering laws or regulations. For example, HSBC agreed to pay $665 million in civil money penalties to various US regulators, including the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency1.

The other two options, C and D, are not as common or relevant to the 2012 HSBC settlement. Loss of bank charter/license may occur in extreme cases where the institution is deemed unfit to operate or poses a serious threat to the financial system. Imprisonment of bank employees may occur if the employees are found guilty of criminal charges, such as fraud, conspiracy, or wilful violation of anti-money laundering laws. However, these outcomes are usually reserved for individuals, not institutions, and depend on the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

 these are the essential components of an effective anti-money laundering program for any financial institution, especially an offshore one. According to the CAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, an anti-money laundering program should include the following elements1:

A risk assessment that identifies and evaluates the money laundering and terrorist financing risks faced by the institution, and the measures taken to mitigate them.

A compliance program that establishes policies, procedures, and controls to prevent, detect, and report money laundering and terrorist financing activities, and to comply with the applicable laws and regulations of the host and chartering countries.

A designated compliance officer who is responsible for overseeing the implementation and maintenance of the compliance program, and for liaising with the relevant authorities and stakeholders.

A training program that provides regular and appropriate education and awareness to senior management and staff on their roles and responsibilities in relation to anti-money laundering and terrorist financing, and on the latest trends and typologies in these areas.

An independent audit function that reviews and tests the adequacy and effectiveness of the compliance program, and reports the findings and recommendations to senior management and the board of directors.

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s capital adequacy requirements for the host country (answer A) are not directly related to anti-money laundering, but rather tothe prudential regulation and supervision of banks. They are important for ensuring the financial soundness and stability of banks, but they are not sufficient to prevent or combat money laundering and terrorist financing2.

According to the CAMS study guide, chapter 1, page 91, placement is the first stage of money laundering, where the illicit funds are introduced into the financial system. Thisstage involves the highest risk of detection, as the money launderers may use various methods to avoid suspicion, such as structuring, commingling, or using cash-intensive businesses. Placement is followed by layering and integration, which are the second and third stages of money laundering, where the illicit funds are moved and disguised through multiple transactions and entities, and then integrated into the legitimate economy as seemingly legal assets.

The other options are not the financial stages of money laundering, although they may be related to some aspects or techniques of money laundering. Option A, integration, is the final stage of money laundering, not the first. Option B, structuring, is a method of placement, not a stage of money laundering. Structuring, also known as smurfing, is the practice of breaking down large amounts of cash into smaller deposits or transactions to avoid reporting thresholds or scrutiny. Option C, off shoring, is a term that refers to the relocation of assets or activities to another jurisdiction, usually for tax or regulatory advantages. Off shoring may be used by money launderers to exploit the differences or loopholes between jurisdictions, but it is not a stage of money laundering.

 the account officer should avoid disclosing any details of the investigation to the customer, as this could compromise the integrity of the law enforcement inquiry, or even constitute tipping off, which is a criminal offense in many jurisdictions12. The account officer should only inform the customer that a legal request has been made, and that the bank is obliged to comply with it, without revealing the nature or scope of the request3. The account officer should also document the communication with the customer, and report it to the appropriate internal authority, such as the compliance officer or the legal department4.

 According to Article 1(3) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 (4th Anti-Money Laundering Directive, 4AMLD), “knowledge, intent or purpose” required as an element for money laundering may be inferred from objective factual circumstances. This means that the prosecution does not need to prove the actual state of mind of the offender, but can rely on the evidence of the surrounding facts and circumstances that indicate the offender’s awareness or intention to launder money. This is consistent with the approach of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which defines money laundering as the intentional act of concealing or disguising the origin of criminal proceeds.

The purchaser being a nominee is a red flag that indicates high potential for money laundering in a real estate purchase. A nominee is a person or entity that acts on behalf of another person or entity, usually to conceal the identity or beneficial ownership of the real owner. Money launderers may use nominees to purchase real estate with illicit funds, and then transfer the property to the real owner or sell it for a profit. This way, they can obscure the source and ownership of the funds, and integrate them into the legitimate economy12.

An institution should incorporate on-going training, periodic audits, and ability to incorporate relevant legislative and regulatory AML changes in its AML policies and procedures. These are essential elements of an effective AML program, as they ensure that the staff are aware of their roles and responsibilities, the institution is compliant with the applicable laws and regulations, and the AML program is updated and adapted to the changing risks and environment.

The junior account manager should file a suspicious transaction report (STR) with the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of Country A, as he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the customer is involved in money laundering or terrorist financing. The customer’s attempt to deposit a large sum of cash, followed by a series of smaller wire transfers from a high-risk jurisdiction, indicates a possible case of structuring or smurfing, which are techniques used by criminals to avoid detection and reporting thresholds. The junior account manager should not close the account, as this could alert the customer and disrupt the investigation by the FIU or law enforcement. The junior account manager should also not notify the anti-money laundering specialist of his bank, as this could create a conflict of interest or breach of confidentiality, unless the bank’s policy requires such notification. The junior account manager should also not offer the customer a more secure method of depositing, as this could be seen as facilitating or condoning the customer’s illicit activities, or exposing the bank to legal or reputational risks.

One of the main challenges and risks for online banks is the verification of customer identity and the prevention of identity fraud. Online banks are more vulnerable to moneylaundering and terrorist financing because they do not have face-to-face contact with their customers and may rely on third-party sources or digital methods to verify customer information. Therefore, the most important recommendation for the anti-money laundering expert to make is that the online bank ensures that prospective new customers can be properly identified and that their identity documents and information are verified using reliable and independent sources. This is also in line with the international standards and best practices for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing, such as the FATF Recommendations, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision principles, and the EU’s Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive123

The other options are less important or less effective than ensuring customer identification. Limiting the amount that can be processed per transaction may reduce the exposure to large-scale money laundering, but it does not prevent the use of multiple transactions or accounts to launder smaller amounts. Setting up automated programs to analyze transactions for money laundering activity may enhance the detection and reporting of suspicious transactions, but it does not address the root cause of money laundering, which is the concealment of the source and ownership of illicit funds. Ensuring that a firewall is set up to protect the transactions may improve the security and confidentiality of the online banking system, but it does not prevent the misuse of the system by money launderers who have legitimate access to the system123

A money laundering investigation that involves multiple countries can be challenging due to different legal systems, languages, cultures, and levels of cooperation. Two factors that can assist such an investigation are:

Law enforcement and other authorities should have access to financial information that is pertinent to the investigation. This can help them trace the flow of illicit funds, identify the perpetrators and beneficiaries, and gather evidence for prosecution. Financial information can be obtained from various sources, such as financial institutions, financial intelligence units, regulators, and international organizations.

Law enforcement and other authorities should be allowed to establish and utilize joint investigative teams with law enforcement in other countries. This can enhance coordination, communication, and information sharing among the authorities involved, and allow them to pool resources, expertise, and evidence. Joint investigative teams can also facilitate mutual legal assistance and extradition requests.

According to the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Private Banking, the beneficial owners of a private banking account are those who generally have ultimate control over the funds in the account and those who are the ultimate source of funds for the account and whose source of wealth should be subject to due diligence1. These two criteria are meant to ensure that the bank knows who is ultimately behind the account and where the funds come from, in order to prevent the use of the bank for money laundering or other criminal purposes. Authorized signers on the account or those who have legal title to a controlling share interest in the customer are not necessarily the beneficial owners, as they may act on behalf of others or have limited influence over the account.

According to the ACAMS Study Guide 6th Edition, Chapter 2, page 38, one of the steps that a financial institution should take when it suspects money laundering activity is to file a suspicious transaction report (STR) or a suspicious activity report (SAR) to the relevant authorities. This will alert the regulators and law enforcement of the potentialmoney laundering scheme and provide them with valuable information to trace the funds and identify the perpetrators.

Another step that a financial institution should take is to identify any unusual or suspicious wire transfers initiated by casas de cambio to jurisdictions outside of Mexico that bear no apparent business relationship with that casa de cambio. This could indicate that the casas de cambio are involved in layering and integration stages of money laundering, where they are moving the illicit funds across borders and disguising their origin and ownership. The financial institution should monitor and document these wire transfers and report them to the authorities if necessary.

Option B is not a relevant step to trace funds through the bank, as it does not provide any information about the source, destination, or purpose of the funds. A decrease in the sale of large denomination U.S. bank notes to casas de cambio by the bank could be due to various factors, such as market demand, exchange rates, or regulatory changes, and does not necessarily indicate money laundering activity.

Option C is also not a relevant step to trace funds through the bank, as it does not indicate any connection to the suspected money laundering scheme. Deposits by casas de cambio that include third-party items, such as sequentially numbered monetary instruments, could be legitimate transactions that are part of the normal business operations of the casas de cambio. Unless there is evidence that these deposits are related to the sale of large denomination U.S. bank notes or the Mexican syndicate, they are not useful for tracing the funds.

The audit function should report to the audit committee of the board of directors (or similar oversight body) and independently evaluate the risk management and controls of the bank through periodic assessments, including the adequacy of the bank’s controls to mitigate the identified risks, the effectiveness of the bank’s staff’s execution of the controls, the effectiveness of the compliance oversight and quality controls and the effectiveness of the training.

 the correspondent bank has engaged in a high-risk activity that could expose the primary bank to sanctions violations, reputational damage, and regulatory scrutiny. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces economic and tradesanctions against targeted foreign countries, regimes, terrorists, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States1. Opening branches in a country on the OFAC list indicates that the correspondent bank is not complying with the sanctions requirements, and could be facilitating transactions for sanctioned entities or individuals. This would pose a serious risk for the primary bank, which is responsible for conducting due diligence and monitoring of its correspondent banking relationships2. Therefore, the primary bank should terminate the relationship with the correspondent bank to avoid any potential liability or penalties.

The other options are not as compelling as A, because they do not necessarily indicate that the correspondent bank is violating any laws or regulations, or that the primary bank is exposed to significant risks. Option B could be a cause for concern, but it does not imply that the correspondent bank is involved in any wrongdoing, or that the compliance officer has any influence over the correspondent banking activities. Option C could suggest that the correspondent bank is engaging in unusual or suspicious transactions, but it does not mean that the primary bank should terminate the relationship immediately, as it could also be a result of changes in the correspondent bank’s business profile, customer base, or market conditions. Option D is a normal and expected part of the correspondent banking relationship, as the primary bank has the right and obligation to request transactional details from the correspondent bank to verify the legitimacy and source of funds, and to identify any red flags or anomalies3.

During an internal investigation, employees should be instructed to do the following actions:

Inform counsel of all request for documentation: This is to ensure that the legal rights and obligations of the organization and the employees are protected and respected. Counsel can also advise on the scope, relevance, and confidentiality of the requested documents1.

Make copies of all documents provided to law enforcement: This is to maintain a record of the information that has been disclosed and to prevent any loss or alteration of the original documents. Copies should be made before the documents are handed over to law enforcement2.

Keep a log of the documents requested: This is to track the progress and status of the investigation and to avoid any duplication or omission of the requested documents. The log should include the date, time, description, and location of the documents, as well as the name and contact details of the person who requested and received them3.

Providing corporate documents directly to law enforcement, on the other hand, is not an action that employees should be instructed to do during an internal investigation. This is because law enforcement may not have the legal authority or the proper warrant to access the documents, and doing so may violate the privacy or confidentiality of the organization or the employees. Employees should consult with counsel before providing any documents to law enforcement4.

 The correct answer is B, as a customer acceptance policy is an essential element of KYC standards according to the Basel Committee’s Customer Due Diligence for Bankspaper1. A customer acceptance policy defines the types of customers that the bank is willing to accept, and the conditions and limitations that apply to such relationships. A customer acceptance policy helps the bank to avoid customers who are likely to pose a higher than average risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, or who are not willing to provide sufficient information for identification and verification purposes1.

it describes the word “certification” as a written representation by a respondent bank, certifying that they do not do business with shell banks. This is one of the requirements for correspondent accounts in the USA PATRIOT Act, which is a law enacted in 2001 to enhance the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) measures in the United States. The USA PATRIOT Act requires that correspondent banks, which are banks that provide services to other banks, such as clearing, settlement, or cash management, to obtain a certification from their respondent banks, which are banks that receive services from correspondent banks, to ensure that they are not involved in money laundering or terrorist financing activities. One of the elements of the certification is that the respondent bank does not do business with shell banks, which are banks that have no physical presence or meaningful supervision in any jurisdiction, and are often used by money launderers and other criminals to hide their identity and funds.

The other options are not necessarily the word “certification” as a written representation by a respondent bank under the USA PATRIOT Act, although they may have some relevance or importance depending on the circumstances and the nature of the correspondent relationship. Option A describes a possible certification by a federal receiver, which is a person appointed by a court to take custody and control of the assets of a failed bank, but this is not related to the correspondent accounts requirements in the USA PATRIOT Act. Option B describes a possible certification by a respondent bank, certifying that they do not do business with politically exposed persons (PEPs), which are individuals who hold or have held prominent public positions or their close associates or family members, and who may pose a higher risk of money laundering or corruption, but this is not a mandatory element of the certification under the USA PATRIOT Act, although itmay be a good practice or a risk-based measure. Option C describes a possible certification by a correspondent bank, certifying that they do not open correspondent accounts for alternative remittance companies, which are businesses that provide money transfer or payment services outside the formal banking system, and which may pose a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, but this is not a requirement for the respondent bank under the USA PATRIOT Act, although it may be a regulatory obligation or a risk-based measure for the correspondent bank.

a vehicle that is historically most often used to hide beneficial ownership, which is an offshore company. An offshore company is a legal entity that is incorporated or registered in a foreign jurisdiction, usually with low or no taxes, high confidentiality, and lax regulation. Offshore companies can be used by money launderers and other criminals to conceal the true identity and ownership of the funds or assets that they control, andto evade taxes, reporting, or legal obligations in their home jurisdictions. Offshore companies can also be layered with other vehicles, such as trusts, foundations, or nominees, to create complex and opaque structures that make it difficult for authorities to trace the source and destination of illicit funds.

The other options are not necessarily vehicles that are most often used to hide beneficial ownership, although they may pose some risks or challenges depending on the circumstances and the risk profile of the customers and countries involved. Option A describes a professional association, which is a group of individuals or entities that share a common profession or interest, such as lawyers, accountants, or doctors. Professional associations may be involved in money laundering or terrorist financing as facilitators, intermediaries, or advisors, but they are not typically used to hide beneficial ownership. Option C describes a limited liability partnership, which is a legal entity that combines the features of a partnership and a corporation, and limits the liability of its partners. Limited liability partnerships may be used by money launderers or terrorist financiers to obscure the ownership or control of funds or assets, but they are not as common or as secretive as offshore companies. Option D describes a charitable organization, which is a non-profit entity that is established for a charitable, religious, educational, or other public benefit purpose. Charitable organizations may be abused by money launderers or terrorist financiers to divert funds or assets for illicit purposes, but they are not usually used to hide beneficial ownership.

According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations, simplified customer due diligence (CDD) or reduced measures could be acceptable for certain types of products or transactions that have a low risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, based on a reasonable assessment of the risk by countries or by financial institutions. These include:

Life insurance policies where the annual premium is no more than USD/EUR 1,000 or a single premium of no more than USD/EUR 2,500. This is because the amount of money involved is relatively small and the payout is usually contingent on a specific event, such as death or disability, which reduces the likelihood of abuse by criminals.

Insurance policies for pension schemes if there is no surrender clause and the policy cannot be used as collateral. This is because the beneficiaries of these policies are usually predetermined and the funds are locked in until retirement age, which limits the possibility of transferring or withdrawing the money for illicit purposes.

A pension, superannuation or similar scheme that provides retirement benefits to employees, where contributions are made by way of deduction from wages and the scheme rules do not permit the assignment of a member’s interest under the scheme. This is because the source of funds is known and verified by the employer and the scheme is regulated and supervised by competent authorities, which reduces the risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

The other option, trusts where the settlor, trustee and beneficiaries are identified and the shares are in bearer form, is not eligible for simplified CDD or reduced measures, because the use of bearer shares poses a high risk of anonymity and concealment of beneficial ownership, which could facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing.

According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision principles, the most important question the banker should ask when opening a numbered or alternate name account is who will control the account. This is because such accounts pose a higher risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, as they can be used to conceal the identity and beneficial ownership of the funds. Therefore, the banker should perform enhanceddue diligence and verify the identity and source of funds of the person who has the authority to operate the account, as well as the purpose and nature of the business relationship12

The other questions are less relevant or secondary to the issue of control. The inheritance of the proceeds in the event of the businessman’s death is a matter of succession law and does not affect the identification of the beneficial owner. The amount of money deposited into the account may indicate the level of risk, but does not reveal the origin or destination of the funds. The account-opening date is a procedural detail thatdoes not affect the compliance with the anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing standards12

This is when a customer or a transaction does not provide sufficient or credible information about their identity, source of funds, business activity, or purpose of the transaction. Lack of transparency can indicate that the customer or the transaction is trying to conceal the origin, ownership, or destination of illicit funds, or to evade regulatory scrutiny or reporting obligations. Lack of transparency is a common risk factor for money laundering and terrorist financing, especially in high-risk jurisdictions or sectors.

The other options are not necessarily red flags, although they may increase the risk or require further due diligence depending on the circumstances and the risk profile of the customers and countries involved. Option A describes a referral by a longtime friend of the dealer, which may be a legitimate source of trust or business relationship, but it does not substitute the need for proper customer identification and verification. Option B describes the location of the precious metals dealer, which may be a high-risk jurisdiction due to factors such as weak governance, corruption, crime, or sanctions, but it does not imply that the dealer or the customer is involved in money laundering. Option C describes the amount and nature of the transaction, which may be unusual or large, but it does not necessarily indicate money laundering, as long as the customer can provide a reasonable explanation and evidence for the source and use of funds.

'https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/sites/default/files/wb/pdfs/wolfsberg-standards/8.%20Wolfsberg-Correspondent-Banking-Principles-2014.pdf - page 6 Monitoring and Reporting of Suspicious Activities The institution shall implement bank-wide policies and procedures to detect and investigate unusual or suspicious activity and report any such activity as required by applicable law. These will include guidance on what is considered to be unusual or suspicious and give examples thereof. The policies and procedures shall include appropriate monitoring of the Correspondent Bank’s activity, incorporating due diligence results such as customer risk rating and other factors considered meaningful in the assessment of transaction activity risk. In turn, the results of suspicious activity monitoring shall be factored into the periodic review of the client’s file, particularly when the results of transaction monitoring indicate elevated risk levels.

Precious metals, such as gold and silver, pose a high risk of money laundering because they have some features that make them attractive to criminals. According to the FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach for Dealers in Precious Metals and Stones1, these features include:

Some precious metals can be formed into other objects, making easier to transport. For example, gold can be melted and shaped into jewellery, coins, bars, or other items that can be easily concealed and moved across borders. This makes it difficult for law enforcement and customs authorities to detect and seize the illicit proceeds of crime.

Precious metals have high intrinsic value in a relatively compact form and are easy to convert into currency. For example, gold has a stable and universal value that can be exchanged for cash or other assets in any market. This makes it easy for criminals to store, transfer, and launder their illicit funds without leaving a trace in the formal financial system.

The other two options, C and D, are not as relevant to the risk of money laundering. The value of precious metals is determined by the market forces of supply and demand, and it is not easy to inflate or manipulate it. Precious metals can be used in many high-tech commercial applications, but this does not necessarily make them more valuable or more prone to money laundering.

 According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the insurance products that is particularly vulnerable to money laundering is annuity, which is “a contract that provides a series of payments over a specified period of time, usually for the life of the annuitant” (p. 223). Annuities can be used by money launderers to deposit large sums of illicit funds in a single transaction, or to receive regular payments from a legitimate source after paying the premiums with dirty money. Annuities can also be surrendered or transferred to third parties, making it difficult to trace the origin and destination of funds.

Bringing $15,000 worth of chips into the casino is a red flag because it could indicate that the customer is trying to avoid the currency transaction reporting (CTR) requirement for cash transactions over $10,0001. Requesting a wire transfer to an unrelated third party is another red flag because it couldindicate that the customer is trying to conceal the source or destination of the funds, or transfer them to a high-risk jurisdiction2.

According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the best practices for dealing with law enforcement inquiries is to verify the identity and authority of the law enforcement officer before providing any information (p. 224). This is to ensure that the inquiry is legitimate and not a phishing attempt or a breach of confidentiality. The compliance officer should also document the inquiry and the information provided, and consult with legal counsel if necessary. The other options are not appropriate, as they may either violate the law, compromise the investigation, or create unnecessary work.

The bank should request a formal letter be submitted to verify the validity of the request, as this is the best practice to ensure compliance with the law and protect customer privacy. The bank should not confirm or deny the existence of a customer relationship, nor provide any information without proper authorization. The bank should also not inform the board of directors before responding to the request, as this could compromise the confidentiality of the investigation or alert the customer.

The U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. OFAC publishes lists of individuals and entities that are subject to various sanctions programs, such as the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), the Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (SSI List), and the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List (FSE List). These lists are updated frequently and can be accessed through OFAC’s website or other sources12.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. FATF publishes lists of jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) regimes, and calls on its members and other countries to apply enhanced due diligence or counter-measures to protect themselves from the risks emanating from these jurisdictions. These lists are updated periodically and can be accessed through FATF’s website or other sources34.

According to the Basel Committee’s paper on Customer Due Diligence for Banks1, banks should review their existing customer relationships on a regular basis, especially for higher risk categories of customers or business relationships. This includes identifying whether the customer or the beneficial owner is a PEP, either at the account opening stage or later, as a result of a change in the customer’s circumstances or profile. The paper also states that banks should apply a risk-based approach to determine the appropriate level and type of due diligence depending on the risk profile of the customer or the beneficial owner.

According to the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), a financial institution or business must establish an anti-money laundering (AML) program that includes at least four elements: (a) a system of internal policies, procedures and controls to prevent, detect and report money laundering and other illicit activities; (b) a designated compliance officer who is responsible for overseeing the implementation and effectiveness of the AML program; © an ongoing employee training program that covers the legal and regulatory obligations, the risks and red flags of money laundering, and the roles and responsibilities of the staff in the AML program; and (d) an independent audit function that tests and evaluates the adequacy and compliance of the AML program12.

While the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a key agency that enforces economic and trade sanctions against targeted foreign countries, entities and individuals, it is not part of the BSA or the AML program requirements. However, financial institutions and businesses are expected to comply with OFAC regulations and screen their customers and transactions against the OFAC lists of sanctioned parties. Failure to do so may result in civil or criminal penalties34. Therefore, it is advisable for financial institutions and businesses to have an OFAC program that is integrated with their AML program, but it is not a mandatory element that they have to specifically address in their AML program.

The USA PATRIOT Act is a comprehensive legislation that was enacted in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and aimed to strengthen the US government’s ability to prevent, detect, and prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing. Among its many provisions, the USA PATRIOT Act contains several sections that have extraterritorial reach, meaning that they apply to foreign entities or activities that have a nexus with the US. Three of these sections are:

Section 319(b), which allows for the US Attorney General or the Secretary of the Treasury to issue a subpoena or other legal order to any foreign bank that maintains a correspondent account in the US, requiring the production of records relating to such account or any account at the foreign bank, including records maintained outside the US12. This section also allows foreign banksto voluntarily designate a registered agent in the US to accept service of such subpoenas or orders12.

Section 313, which prohibits US financial institutions from establishing, maintaining, administering, or managing correspondent accounts for foreign shell banks, which are banks thathave no physical presence in any country and are not affiliated with a regulated financial group34. This section also requires US financial institutions to take reasonable steps to ensure that their correspondent accounts with foreign banks are not being used to provide banking services indirectly to foreign shell banks34.

Section 311, which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to designate foreign jurisdictions, financial institutions, classes of transactions, or types of accounts as being of “primary money laundering concern” and to impose special measures to address such concerns . These special measures may include requiring US financial institutions to obtain and retain information on the beneficial owners of foreign accounts, prohibiting or imposing conditions on the opening or maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts for foreign financial institutions, or requiring US financial institutions to identify the customers of their foreign correspondent account holders . The Secretary of the Treasury may also order a US financial institution to terminate a correspondent account within 10 days if the foreign bank fails to comply with a subpoena or other request for information under Section 319(b) .

The inherent level of anti-money laundering risk across the entire organization depends on various factors, such as the nature, size, complexity, and structure of the business, the customers, the products and services, and the countries or jurisdictions involved. Among the four options given, the transaction monitoring program and the customer due diligence program are not factors that determine the inherent risk, but rather measures that mitigate the risk. Therefore, they are not relevant for the compliance officer’s purpose. The countries that the bank operates in and the products and services offered by the bank are important factors that affect the inherent risk, as they may expose the bank to different levels of money laundering threats, vulnerabilities, and regulatory requirements. For example, some countries or jurisdictions have high levels of corruption, unstable governments, or are known as money laundering havens1. They could also have inadequate AML/CFT regulatory and judicial frameworks, or be subject to economic sanctions2. Similarly, some products and services may pose higher risks thanothers, such as those that involve cash transactions, cross-border transfers, anonymous or non-face-to-face customers, or complex or innovative features34.

The branch manager should conduct further investigation before taking any other action, as this activity may indicate possible money laundering or fraud. The branch manager should review the transaction records of the customers and the teller, and look for any unusual or suspicious patterns, such as large or frequent cash deposits, round amounts, structured transactions, or inconsistent information. The branch manager should also interview the teller and the customers, and ask them about the nature and purpose of their relationship, the source and use of funds, and the reason for choosing the same teller. The branch manager should document the findings and report any suspicious activity to the appropriate authorities, if necessary.

Option A indicates potential money laundering activity by a lawyer, as it involves the use of a trust account to receive and transfer funds from unknown sources in high risk jurisdictions, without any apparent legitimate purpose or explanation. This could be a sign of layering, where the money launderer attempts to conceal the origin and ownership of the illicit funds by moving them through multiple accounts and jurisdictions. Option B does not necessarily indicate money laundering, as the source of the funds is a reputable entity and the transfer could be explained by a legitimate transaction or service. Option C does not necessarily indicate money laundering, as the bank draft could be a payment for a legal service or a settlement between parties. Option D does not necessarily indicate money laundering, as the cash deposit could be a fee for a legal service or a donation, and the amount could be below the reporting threshold to avoid unnecessary paperwork or scrutiny.

According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s Customer Due Diligence for Banks, the compliance function should provide an evaluation of a bank’s policies and procedures independent from its management. The compliance function is responsible for ensuring that the bank adheres to the relevant laws, regulations, and standards on customer due diligence, anti-money laundering, and combating the financing of terrorism. The compliance function should also monitor the implementation and effectiveness of the bank’s customer due diligence policies and procedures, identify and report any breaches or deficiencies, and recommend corrective actions or improvements. The compliance function should have sufficient authority, independence, resources, and access to information to perform its duties effectively.

The most important consideration when deciding whether to recommend closing the account is the institution’s anti-money laundering policy. This is because the policy should provide clear and consistent criteria for account closure decisions, based on the risk assessment, the nature and severity of the suspicious activity, the customer due diligence information, and the legal and regulatory obligations of the institution. The policy should also ensure that the account closure process is independent, objective, and transparent, and that it does not compromise the confidentiality of the suspicious transaction report or the investigation.

The charity frequently withdrawing cash from the bank indicates possible terrorist financing, as cash transactions are often used to conceal the source, destination, and purpose of funds. Cash transactions also make it difficult to trace the flow of funds and identify the beneficiaries. Terrorist financiers may use charities as a cover to collect and distribute funds for their activities, and may exploit the cash-based nature of charitable donations to avoid detection12.

Transaction monitoring alerts requirefurther analysisto determine whether they indicategenuine suspicious activity or a false positive.

Option C (Correct):Requesting information from the relationship manager helps gather customer background details, past transaction patterns, and business rationale.

Option A (Incorrect):Below-the-line testing assesses system effectiveness but does not resolve an immediate AML alert.

Option B (Incorrect):Directly contacting a counterparty bank may violate privacy regulations and should only be done if escalation is required.

Option D (Incorrect):Restricting access without due diligence may lead to regulatory and reputational risks.

Best Practices for Investigating AML Alerts:

Review transaction history and customer risk profile.

Engage the relationship manager for business context.

Escalate to AML compliance teams if red flags persist.

When reviewing business operations of a Money Services Business (MSB), it is critical to identify behaviors that indicate potential money laundering activity. TheCAMS Study Guide – 6th Editionoutlines severalred flagscommonly associated with MSBs.

Option Ais correct:

A customer beinghesitant to provide beneficiary information, such as the name or address, is a red flag. It may indicate attempts to hide the true purpose or recipient of the funds and could suggeststructuring or layering activity.

Option Dis correct:

A customer usingmultiple accounts under different namesto conduct transactions is a strong red flag. This could indicate efforts toobscure ownership, avoid detection, or conductsuspicious structuringbehavior to stay below reporting thresholds.

Option Bis incorrect:

While large cash deposits from cash-intensive businesses may require further review, they are not inherently suspicious unlessinconsistent with the nature of the business or transaction volume.

Option Cis incorrect:

Currency exchanges under the reporting threshold, even from high-risk jurisdictions, are not in themselves red flags unless they show a pattern ofstructuringor are part oflarger suspicious behavior.

Option Eis incorrect:

Frequent small-dollar transfers to a native country may benormal remittance behaviorand only become suspicious if tied to additional indicators such asstructuring or third-party involvement.

According to the FATF Guidance on Politically Exposed Persons1, financial institutions should assess the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with a business relationship or transaction with a PEP, their family members and close associates, on a case-by-case basis. This includes obtaining information on the source of wealth and source of funds of the customer and the beneficial owner, as well as conducting enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. Therefore, the appropriate next step for the analyst is to review the beneficial ownership of the customer to determine if the PEP or any other person poses a higher risk, and to apply additional measures accordingly. Removing the PEP as the authorized signatory, re-categorizing the customer as high-risk, or categorizing the authorized PEP signatory as high-risk are not necessarily required or sufficient steps, as they do not take into account the specific circumstances and risk factors of the customer and the PEP.

Transaction monitoring governanceinvolves ensuring thatAML detection systems are effective, aligned with regulatory standards, and capable of identifying evolving threats.

Option B (Correct):Legal cooperation is essential for responding to subpoenas and law enforcement inquiries.

Option D (Correct):Regularly updating transaction monitoring scenarios ensures that the system adapts to emerging financial crime trends.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option A (Incorrect):SARs cannot be withdrawn unless an error was made—once filed, SARs remain confidential and must be retained.

Option C (Incorrect):Client profile updates are a CDD/KYC function, not directly related to transaction monitoring governance.

Best Practices for Transaction Monitoring Governance:

Regularly review system effectiveness through validation tests.

Collaborate with legal and compliance teams for risk mitigation.

Use AI and data analytics to refine detection accuracy.

OFAC sanctions apply extraterritorially, meaning U.S. persons must comply regardless of their location.

Option A (Correct):OFAC sanctions apply to all U.S. citizens, permanent residents, entities incorporated in the U.S. (including foreign branches), and individuals/entities within U.S. jurisdiction.

Option B (Incorrect):Foreign branches of U.S.-incorporated entities must comply with OFAC sanctions.

Option C (Incorrect):OFAC sanctions apply to all U.S. citizens, including dual nationals.

Option D (Incorrect):U.S. citizens and permanent residents must comply with OFAC sanctions even when located abroad.

Best Practices for OFAC Compliance:

Screen all transactions against the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list.

Ensure compliance programs extend to foreign branches and subsidiaries.

Monitor international business activities for potential sanctions violations.

 Predicate offenses are the criminal activities that generate the proceeds that are later laundered through money laundering schemes. A country that does not have strong predicate offenses and is lax in prosecuting AML cases could suffer from increased organized crime and corruption, as criminals would have more opportunities and incentives to engage in illicit activities and evade detection and punishment. Organized crime and corruption can have serious social and economic consequences for a country, such as undermining the rule of law, eroding public trust, threatening national security, harming human rights, reducing economic growth, and distorting market competition123.

Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs)serve as national centers for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating AML/CFT information.

Option B (Correct):FIUs analyze SARs and STRs to detect money laundering and terrorist financing risks.

Option D (Correct):FIUs disseminate financial intelligence to local and international law enforcement agencies and other FIUs.

Option E (Correct):FIUs receive SARs/STRs from financial institutions, which form the basis for their analysis.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option A (Incorrect):FIUs do not prosecute cases; they refer findings to law enforcement agencies.

Option C (Incorrect):FIUs share intelligence, but prosecution is handled by judicial authorities, not FIUs.

Best Practices for FIUs:

Enhance data-sharing agreements with domestic and international agencies.

Use AI and analytics tools to detect suspicious financial patterns.

Ensure secure handling of sensitive AML/CFT data.

When assessing the risk rating of customers, financial institutions should consider various factors that may indicate the potential for money laundering, terrorist financing, or other illicit activities. According to the ACAMS Study Guide for the CAMS Certification Examination1, some of the key risk factors are:

Customer risk: This refers to the characteristics of the customer that may affect their risk profile, such as their identity, occupation, source of funds, business activities, reputation, and political exposure. For example, customers who are politically exposed persons (PEPs), cash-intensive businesses, non-resident customers, or customers with complex ownership structures may pose a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

Geographic risk: This refers to the location of the customer, their business, or their transactions, and the level of risk associated with that location. For example, customers who are based in, operate in, or transact with jurisdictions that have weak anti-money laundering (AML) regulations, high levels of corruption, or are subject to sanctions or embargoes may pose a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

Product risk: This refers to the type of products or services that the customer uses or offers, and the level of risk associated with those products or services. For example, customers who use or offer products or services that are anonymous, complex, or facilitate cross-border transactions may pose a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

Other risk factors that may be considered include transaction risk, delivery channel risk, and industry risk2. However, these are not among the options given in the question.

Cross-borderAML investigationsrequire cooperation throughofficial channels, such as theEgmont Group.

Option D (Correct):TheEgmont Groupis an international network ofFIUs that facilitates secure information exchangein financial crime investigations.

Option A (Incorrect):While sovereignty applies,formal international cooperation mechanisms exist.

Option B (Incorrect):AML cooperation is allowed under legal frameworks(e.g.,MLATs, Egmont Secure Web).

Option C (Incorrect):Information-sharing is restrictedtoauthorized government agencies, not all organizations.

Terrorist financing (TF) differs from traditional money laundering, as funds can originate fromlegitimate sources(e.g., donations, charities) and often involvelow-value transactions.

Option A (Correct):Non-profits with no online presencecan beshell organizations used to finance terrorism.

Option C (Correct):Small-dollar payments to high-risk jurisdictions(e.g., FATF-listed countries)may indicate terrorist funding activity.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option B (Incorrect):Crowdfunding payments with transparency and project detailsare generallylow-risk.

Option D (Incorrect):Charities helping refugeesmay behigh-risk but not automatically suspicious.

Option E (Incorrect):Structuring below reporting thresholds is more indicative of money laundering than terrorist financing.

Red Flags for Terrorist Financing:

Frequent low-value transactions to conflict zones.

Use of charities and non-profits as fronts for terror groups.

Funds moving through unregulated crowdfunding platforms.

Best Practices for Detecting Terrorist Financing:

Identify transactions involving known terrorist financing typologies.

Enhance monitoring of non-profit organizations operating in high-risk regions.

Use negative news screening to detect links to sanctioned entities.

The customer directing the payment of the money borrowed to an unrelated third party is a red flag for potential money laundering, as it could indicate layering or integration of illicit funds. The other options are not necessarily indicative of money laundering, although they could warrant further monitoring or due diligence depending on the customer profile and risk assessment.

Many jurisdictions lack robust sanctions frameworks, requiring international cooperation and education to improve compliance.

Option B (Correct):Educational initiatives such as AML/sanctions training and workshops help raise awareness and build capacity.

Option D (Correct):Bilateral cooperation allows knowledge-sharing and technical assistance between regulatory authorities.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option A (Incorrect):Trade restrictions may pressure non-compliant nations, but they do not directly improve sanctions awareness.

Option C (Incorrect):Enforcing fines without prior education or assistance is ineffective and may create diplomatic tensions.

Best Practices for Sanctions Awareness & Compliance:

Develop international AML/sanctions training programs for emerging markets.

Encourage diplomatic engagement to strengthen legal frameworks.

Leverage FATF’s Mutual Evaluation process to assess progress.

In the context ofgambling and gaming sectors, a well-known money laundering typology is the use of platforms tointroduce illicit funds and withdraw them as "winnings". When a customerdeposits large cash amounts and quickly withdraws themwithout engaging in actual gambling, it indicates"placement and layering"techniques.

This behavior is indicative of attempts todisguise the origin of illicit funds, converting them into legitimate-looking financial flows. It is considered a classic red flag in AML programs related to casinos and online gaming.

MSBs arevulnerable to financial crimedue to theircash-intensive natureandremittance services.

Option D (Correct):Hesitation to provide beneficiary detailssuggestsanonymity concerns, a common money laundering tactic.

Option E (Correct):Usingmultiple accounts under different namesis aknown structuring techniquetoevade detection.

Option A (Incorrect):Exchanging foreign currency is normal, though higher-risk transactions require monitoring.

Option B (Incorrect):Cash deposits are expectedin MSBs but needadditional risk factorsto be considered suspicious.

Option C (Incorrect):Frequent small transfersmay be normal forremittance businesses.

Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) applies to high-risk customers and transactions, includingpolitically exposed persons (PEPs), high-risk jurisdictions, and correspondent banking relationships.

Option C (Correct):Correspondent banking relationships with high-risk jurisdictions require EDDto prevent cross-border financial crime.

Option D (Correct):Ambassadors are considered PEPs, which require EDD due to corruption risks.

Option E (Correct):A current prime minister is a high-profile PEP, requiringEDD and ongoing transaction monitoring.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option A (Incorrect):The individual no longer holds a PEP position and is in a low-risk country, soEDD is not required.

Option B (Incorrect):A local footballer does not present a high financial crime risk warranting EDD.

EDD Best Practices for High-Risk Customers:

Verify the source of wealth and funds for PEPs.

Conduct ongoing transaction monitoring on high-risk accounts.

Apply stricter controls on correspondent banking with high-risk jurisdictions.

 According to the BSA/AML Manual1, one purpose of filing SARs is to identify violations or potential violations of law to the appropriate law enforcement authorities for criminal investigation. Therefore, when an institution receives a document request from law enforcement with regard to an STR that the institution has filed, it should cooperate and provide the documents that were previously collected to support the STR. This will help the law enforcement agency to conduct its investigation and follow up on the suspicious activity reported by the institution. The institution should also maintain the confidentiality of the STR and the document request, and avoid tipping off the customer or any other person involved in the suspicious activity.

According to the ACAMS study guide, one of the best practices for dealing with law enforcement inquiries is to verify the identity and authority of the law enforcement officer before providing any information (p. 224). This is to ensure that the inquiry is legitimate and not a phishing attempt or a breach of confidentiality. The compliance officer should also document the inquiry and the information provided, and consult with legal counsel if necessary. The other options are not appropriate, as they may either violate the law, compromise the investigation, or create unnecessary work.

Q Law enforcement may be given access to a financial institution customer’s financial records if they serve a legal summons or subpoena, or if they have circumstantial evidence to suspect money laundering. These are two of the exceptions to the general rule that financial institutions must protect the privacy of their customers’ financial information under the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA) of 19781. The RFPA alsoallows access to customer records in other situations, such as with the customer’s consent, in response to judicial orders, or for certain intelligence or counterintelligence purposes1.

Option A is incorrect because a suspicious transaction report (STR) does not automatically grant law enforcement access to the customer’s financial records. The STR is a confidential document that is filed by the financial institution to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the country, and the FIU may decide to share the information with law enforcement if it deems appropriate2. However, law enforcement still needs to follow the RFPA procedures to obtain the customer’s records from the financial institution.

Option C is incorrect because the investigation of a customer being made public in the media does not give law enforcement the right to access the customer’s financial records. The media exposure may raise the public interest or the urgency of the investigation, but it does not override the RFPA requirements. Law enforcement still needs to obtain a legal summons, subpoena, or other valid authorization to access the customer’s records from the financial institution.

The financial institution should freeze the funds or assets of designated persons and entities once this decision is approved by the Board. This is to comply with the obligation to implement targeted financial sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) or other relevant authorities. Freezing means preventing any access, use, transfer, or disposal of the funds or assets by the designated persons and entities or by any other person on their behalf. The financial institution should also report the freezing action to the competent authority and the relevant sanctions committee12.

Option A is not a sufficient step to comply with sanctions requirements, but rather a tool to facilitate compliance. Adopting automatic screening systems to detect designated persons and entities can help the financial institution to identify potential matches and flag them for further investigation. However, screening systems are not infallible and may generate false positives or false negatives. Therefore, the financial institution should also conduct manual checks and verification of the screening results13.

Option B is not a relevant step to comply with sanctions requirements, but rather a measure to mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks. Conducting enhanced due diligence for prohibited entities on the sanctions list may be useful to obtain more information about the nature and purpose of the business relationship, the source and destination of the funds, and the beneficial ownership and control structure of the entity. However, enhanced due diligence does not replace the obligation to freeze the funds or assets of the designated persons and entities14.

Option C is not an appropriate step to comply with sanctions requirements, but rather a violation of the obligation to freeze the funds or assets of the designated persons and entities. Changing the risk profile to “high-risk” if an existing customer becomes a sanctioned entity and continuing to monitor further transactions may expose the financial institution to legal and reputational risks, as well as potential sanctions evasion or circumvention. The financial institution should terminate the business relationship with the designated person or entity and freeze their funds or assets without delay1 .

Banks must adhere to strictprivacy lawsandSAR confidentiality ruleswhen handling customer information, especially in cross-border investigations.

Option A (Correct):Banks must consider privacy laws such as theUS Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), theEU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and their internal policies before sharing data.

Option B (Correct):Information should beshared only on a need-to-know basis, ensuring compliance withAML regulations and internal procedures.

Option C (Incorrect):While FinCEN provides SAR guidance, banks do not need to seek FinCEN’s permission for every internal information request.

Option D (Incorrect):International requests must comply with legal frameworks, but there is no universal requirement for approval by national authorities.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations are the international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, and they apply to all countries and financial institutions. The Customer Due Diligence for Banks issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision provides guidance on how banks should conduct CDD and KYC procedures, and how they should manage the risks of correspondent banking and wire transfers. The Egmont Group Statement of Purpose outlines the objectives and functions of the Egmont Group, which is an international network of financial intelligence units (FIUs) that exchange information and cooperate in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. These three materials are relevant and useful for the bank’s expansion plans, as they cover the main aspects of AML/CFT compliance in different jurisdictions and sectors.

The USA PATRIOT Act is a US-specific legislation that enhances the powers and obligations of US authorities and financial institutions in relation to AML/CFT, but it may not be applicable or appropriate for other countries where the bank intends to operate. Therefore, it is not a necessary reference material for the bank’s international department.

Compare customer and transaction records against periodically updated sanctions lists provided by governmental bodies. This is stated in the Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) manual on page 595, which states: “Sanctions screening requirements include that a financial institution should compare customer and transaction records against periodically updated sanctions lists provided by governmental bodies.”

---Wire transfers are one of the most common methods of moving funds across borders and jurisdictions, and therefore pose a high risk of violating OFAC sanctions. A bank’s OFAC sanctions screening audit program should include a test to review the wire transfer screening processes to ensure that potential name hits are investigated promptly and appropriately, and that any blocked or rejected transactions are reported to OFAC in a timely manner. This test would help the bank to assess the effectiveness of its screening system, identify any gaps or weaknesses, and demonstrate its compliance with OFAC regulations.

Funds transfers are electronic payments that move money from one account to another, either within the same financial institution or across different institutions, countries, or currencies1. Funds transfers are commonly used for legitimate purposes, such as remittances, trade, or investment, but they can also be abused by money launderers, terrorists, or fraudsters to move illicit funds or conceal their origin or destination2. Therefore, financial institutions and other entities that offer funds transfer services are required to apply anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing (AML/CFT) measures, such as customer due diligence, transaction monitoring, record-keeping, and reporting of suspicious activities2.

One of the red flags for funds transfers that may indicate money laundering or other criminal activity is when funds transfers are repeatedly sent to the same beneficiary out of line with the business purpose3. This could suggest that the originator and the beneficiary are colluding to layer or integrate illicit funds, or to evade reporting or sanctions requirements. For example, a business may send multiple funds transfers to the same supplier, but the amounts or frequencies do not match the invoices or contracts, or the supplier is located in a high-risk jurisdiction or is subject to sanctions. Alternatively, an individual may send frequent funds transfers to the same person, but the relationship or the reason for the transfers is unclear or inconsistent, or the person is associated with a criminal or terrorist organization. In such cases, the financial institution or the funds transfer service provider should conduct enhanced due diligence, verify the source and purpose of the funds, and report any suspicious activity to the relevant authorities.

The Certified Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) Study Guide states that financial institutions should address all requests from law enforcement agencies completely and in a timely manner (Page 83). Disregarding requests when there is a justifiable reason for doing so is not recommended, as this could impede the investigation. Sharing information about the investigation with analysts is not recommended, as this could compromise the investigation. Delaying responses by informing senior management of requests is also not recommended, as this could result in a delay in the investigation.

Non-compliance with anti-money laundering (AML) laws and regulations can lead to severe consequences for both financial institutions and individuals. One of the indirect consequences is the imposition of punitive fines. These fines can vary based on the type of violation and the institution’s willingness to address the issue. Additionally, non-compliance may damage a company’s reputation, impacting its standing in the market and potentially leading to financial losses beyond the fines themselves123.

Economic sanctions are measures imposed by countries or international bodies to exert pressure on individuals, entities, or nations that engage in undesirable behavior or actions. Sanctions aim to restrict or prohibit certain economic activities with the targeted parties, such as trade, investments, or financial transactions. They serve various purposes, including achieving foreign policy and national security objectives and deterring undesired actions by countries or entities. Sanctions can be comprehensive (affecting an entire country) or targeted (specific businesses, groups, or individuals), with a recent trend toward minimizing harm to innocent civilians12.

 According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, one of the challenges of online financial technologies is the difficulty of verifying the identity and legitimacy of the customers and counterparties. This creates opportunities formoney launderers and other criminals to exploit the anonymity and speed of online transactions to move and conceal illicit funds. The other options are not directly related to the money laundering risk posed by online financial technologies.

Thethird line of defense (internal audit)providesindependent oversightof an institution’sAML/CFT compliance framework.

Option B (Correct):The internal audit function should report to the board’s audit committeeto maintainindependence and objectivity.

Option A (Incorrect):While frequent audits are essential, AML audits should be risk-based rather than mandated at a strict 12-month interval.

Option C (Incorrect):Internal audit must assess remediation plansto ensure they adequatelyaddress AML deficiencies.

Option D (Incorrect):The third line of defense should not be involved in daily AML operationstoavoid conflicts of interest.

Three Lines of Defense in AML Risk Management:

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Best Practices for AML Audit Function:

Ensure complete independence from AML operations.

Conduct risk-based audits tailored to emerging threats.

Report audit findings to the board for effective oversight.

Casinos and gambling institutionsare highly vulnerable to money launderingbecause they allow theconversion of cash into chips, checks, or electronic credits, which can later be redeemed as “clean” funds.

Option A (Correct):A privately held company funding multiple patrons' betting accounts is highly suspiciousand may indicate:

Structuring/smurfing, where multiple individuals are used to move illicit funds.

Third-party money laundering, where the real source of funds is obscured.

Trade-based money laundering, if linked to non-gaming businesses.

Why Other Options Are Incorrect:

Option B (Incorrect):Placing multiple bets on the same eventis not inherently suspiciousunless linked tofraudulent betting patterns.

Option C (Incorrect):Large chip purchases in cashmay requirereporting, but they do not necessarily indicatemoney laundering.

Option D (Incorrect):Transferring winnings to another operator may beunusual, butnot automatically suspiciousunless the amount is large and unjustified.

Common Money Laundering Techniques in Casinos:

Chip Walking– Buying chips with illicit funds and cashing them out later as "clean" funds.

Casino Account Transfers– Using multiple accounts or third-party accounts to move funds.

High-Value Gambling with No Loss Intent– Betting on both sides of an event to ensure clean withdrawal of funds.

Best Practices for Casino AML Compliance:

Monitor suspicious large transactions and third-party funding activities.

Perform enhanced due diligence (EDD) on high-risk patrons.

File Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) for unusual gambling activity.

Thetimely filing of SARs is legally mandated, and financial institutions mustfollow jurisdiction-specific reporting deadlines.

Option A (Correct):Regulatory requirements dictate SAR filing deadlines(e.g., in the U.S., SARs must be filed within30 calendar daysof detecting suspicious activity).

Option B (Incorrect):30 days is the U.S. standard, but different jurisdictions may havedifferent SAR deadlines(e.g.,EU AMLD mandates prompt reporting).

Option C (Incorrect):Complexity-based reporting delaysare not permitted if theyexceed regulatory timelines.

Option D (Incorrect):Relying solely on professional judgmentrather than regulatory rules can lead tonon-compliance.

SAR Filing Deadlines in Different Jurisdictions:

Jurisdiction

SAR Filing Deadline

United States (FinCEN)

30 calendar days(60 days if no suspect is identified)

United Kingdom (FCA/NCA)

As soon as practicable

European Union (6AMLD)

"Promptly" (no fixed number of days)

Australia (AUSTRAC)

3 business daysfor terrorism financing,14 business daysfor other cases

Why Timely SAR Filing Matters:

Delays in reporting can result in regulatory penalties.

Early SAR filing enables FIUs to take swift action against financial crime.

Non-compliance can lead to fines, criminal charges, and reputational damage.

FIUs act as central hubs for financial crime intelligence, receiving and analyzingSuspicious Activity Reports (SARs)and other data to support law enforcement.

Option A (Correct):FIUscollect, analyze, and disseminate financial intelligencerelated tomoney laundering and terrorist financing.

Option B (Incorrect):FIUsdo not prosecute cases—they refer cases tolaw enforcement agenciesfor prosecution.

Option C (Incorrect):FIUs analyze financial crime data butdo not develop surveillance technology.

Option D (Incorrect):FIUs share intelligencewith law enforcement and regulatory bodies, not directly with private companies.

Types of FIUs and Their Roles:

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Key FIU Responsibilities:

Collect Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs)from financial institutions.

Analyze financial transactionsto identify money laundering patterns.

Disseminate intelligence to law enforcement and regulatory authorities.

Thethird line of defense (internal audit)is responsible forproviding independent assurance to the Board of Directorsaboutthe effectiveness of AML/CFT controls.

Option C (Correct):Theinternal audit function provides independent review and oversight of AML risksto theboard.

Option A (Incorrect):There is no "fourth line of defense" in AML risk management frameworks.

Option B (Incorrect):Thesecond line (compliance & risk management)is responsible formonitoring AML processes but does not provide direct board assurance.

Option D (Incorrect):Thefirst line (business units) manages AML risks dailybut does not provide board assurance.

Best Practices for Internal Audit in AML Programs:

Ensure audits are risk-based and independent.

Report findings directly to the board’s audit committee.

Regularly test AML controls to assess effectiveness.

According to section 313 of the USA PATRIOT Act, a covered financial institution (generally any U.S. bank or broker dealer in securities) is prohibited from establishing, maintaining, administering, or managing a correspondent account in the U.S. for, or on behalf of, a foreign shell bank. A foreign shell bank is defined as a foreign bank that does not have a physical presence in any country. The only exception to this prohibition is if the foreign shell bank is a regulated affiliate of a depository institution, credit union, or foreign bank that maintains a physical presence in the U.S. or a foreign country, respectively. In that case, the U.S. financial institution must obtain a written certification from the foreign bank that it does not provide banking services to any other foreign shell banks.

Aneffective AML programbalancesalert accuracy and operational efficiency.

Option D (Correct):The true positive vs. false positive ratio reflects the efficiency and accuracy of an AML transaction monitoring system.

Option A (Incorrect):The number of alerts does not indicate system effectiveness—many could be false positives.

Option B (Incorrect):Clients exiting for commercial reasons are unrelated to AML efficiency.

Option C (Incorrect):Tracking high-risk customer onboarding is important but does not measure AML effectiveness.

Best Practices for Measuring AML Effectiveness:

Monitor system efficiency through alert validation metrics.

Reduce false positives while maintaining regulatory compliance.

Enhance machine learning and AI models for transaction monitoring.

Along-term, root cause-based approach ensures AML deficiencies are fully remediated.

Option C (Correct):Addressing root causes ensures the institution remains compliant and prevents recurring violations.

Option A (Incorrect):Consulting with an FIU is unnecessary for internal remediation plans.

Option B (Incorrect):Short-term fixes do not resolve systemic AML issues.

Option D (Incorrect):AML compliance improvements may require investment—cost-cutting should not compromise compliance.

Best Practices for AML Audit Remediation:

Conduct root cause analysis before implementing corrective measures.

Develop a long-term compliance improvement plan.

Allocate sufficient resources for sustainable AML enhancements.

International cooperationis essential in AML investigations, and theEgmont GroupfacilitatesFIU-to-FIU information sharing.

Option D (Correct):Egmont Group members can request and share intelligence for AML investigationsunder established protocols.

Option A (Incorrect):Sovereignty does not prevent cooperationif proper legal frameworks exist.

Option B (Incorrect):AML regulations permit international data sharing, especially under agreements likeMutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs).

Option C (Incorrect):Data sharing is restricted to authorized entities, notall organizations.

Why This Matters:

Failure toshare AML intelligence across borderscan enable:

Cross-border money laundering.

Terrorist financing networks to operate undetected.

Regulatory penalties for non-compliance.

Verified Answer: = A. Collect further customer reference data and determine what must be screened and at which frequency. and C. Deploy an independent risk-based test to ensure the screening on this customer is effective.

Comprehensive Detailed Explanation: = When an existing customer changes its business scope and jurisdictions, banks need to manage sanctions compliance risk effectively. Here are the steps they should take:

1. Collect Further Customer Reference Data: Obtain updated information about the customer’s new business activities, locations, and counterparties. Understand the nature of their transactions and assess the associated risks. Determine what specific data elements need to be screened (e.g., names, addresses, beneficial owners) and establish the appropriate screening frequency.

2. Deploy an Independent Risk-Based Test: Conduct a comprehensive risk assessment tailored to the customer’s changes. This assessment should consider factors such as the customer’s industry, geographic exposure, and transaction volume. The risk assessment helps identify high-risk areas that require enhanced scrutiny.

3. Screen Directors and Ultimate Beneficial Owners: Perform sanctions screening not only on the customer but also on their directors and ultimate beneficial owners. This ensures that any potential risks associated with these individuals are identified and mitigated.

4. Perform Politically Exposed Person (PEP) and Negative Media Screenings: Continue to screen the customer and related parties against PEP lists and negative media sources. This helps detect any adverse information related to politically exposed individuals or entities.

By following these steps, banks can proactively manage sanctions compliance risk and safeguard their institution’s reputation while adhering to regulatory requirements12.

Wider exposure to organized crime and corruption: When individuals or communities are exposed to organized crime networks or corrupt practices, they may become more susceptible to engaging in illicit activities. Organized crime groups often exploit vulnerabilities, leading to money laundering.

Weaker development of economy and job opportunities: In regions with limited economic growth and scarce job prospects, individuals may turn to illicit activities as a means of survival. Poverty and lack of legitimate income sources can drive people toward money laundering.

Data sharingbetween financial institutions, FIUs, and law enforcement is essential toAML compliance.

Option A (Correct):Transparent financial systemsdetermoney laundering and terrorist financing.

Option B (Incorrect):FIUsdo not impose sanctions; theycollect and analyze data.

Option C (Incorrect):While data analysis is valuable, thekey goal is financial transparency.

Option D (Incorrect):In many jurisdictions,data sharing is encouraged, withsome restrictions.

 A deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) is a type of enforcement action that allows a financial institution to avoid criminal prosecution if it admits to wrongdoing, pays a fine, and agrees to remediate its AML program deficiencies within a specified period of time1. A cease and desist order (C&D) is another type of enforcement action that requires a financial institution to stop engaging in unsafe or unsound practices or violations of law, and to take corrective actions to address its AML program weaknesses2. Both of these actions are commonly used by regulators to address serious or systemic AML program failures by financial institutions, as evidenced by recent cases345.

According to the ACAMS CAMS Study Guide (the 6th edition), one of the common methods of money laundering in the insurance sector is to purchase policies with illicit funds, overpay premiums, and then cancel or surrender the policies to receive refunds or payouts1. This allows criminals to move and disguise the source of their funds through the insurance company. Therefore, the regular withdrawals from the policy by the end of the month could indicate a money laundering scheme. Moreover, the FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach for the Life Insurance Sector states that unidentified third parties depositing cash to the policy could also pose a high money laundering risk, as cash transactions are difficult to trace and third parties may act as intermediaries or nominees for the real beneficiaries2. Therefore, the insurance company should conduct enhanced due diligence on the policyholder and the third parties, and monitor the transactions for any suspicious activity.

USA PATRIOT Act Section 314(b)allows financial institutions tovoluntarily share information with one another, after notifying the U.S. Treasury, toidentify and report possible money laundering or terrorist financing activities.

Key elements include:

Voluntary participation

Prior notice to FinCEN (part of the U.S. Treasury)

Protection from liability when acting in good faith

Enhanced collaborative detection across institutions

Section 314(a)refers toinformation sharing between law enforcement and financial institutions, not peer-to-peer sharing.

COSMICis an initiative in certain jurisdictions like Singapore, not U.S. regulation.

Regulation (EU) 2024/1624is part of the EU AML framework, not relevant to U.S. institutions.

According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) methodology, financial institutions (FIs) are required to consider filing a suspicious activity report (SAR) in situations where they suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of criminal activity or related to terrorist financing. One such situation is when a beneficiary of a transaction is a politically exposed person (PEP). PEPs are individuals who hold prominent public positions or have close associations with such individuals. Their involvement in transactions can raise red flags due to the potential risk of corruption, money laundering, or other illicit activities1.

According to the Wolfsberg Group, a global association of leading banks that develops guidance and standards for the management of financial crime risks, both private and correspondent banks should monitor account and transactional activity after the proper identification and verification of customers, as part of their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CTF) measures12. This is consistent with the FATF Recommendation 10, which requires financial institutions to conduct ongoing due diligence on their business relationships, including scrutinising transactions to ensure that they are consistent with the customer’s risk profile and source of funds3. Monitoring account and transactional activity is a key component of the risk-based approach, as it enables banks to detect and report suspicious or unusual transactions, identify changes in customer behaviour or circumstances, and update customer information and risk assessments accordingly4.

Money launderers usehigh-value goods(e.g., jewelry, art, and precious metals) todisguise illicit funds.

Option C (Correct):Requesting ahandwritten receipt for a cash purchasesuggests anattempt to avoid record-keeping, a knownmoney laundering technique.

Option A (Incorrect):Buying gold bars withcash and cryptocurrencyisunusualbut notinherently illegalunless the amounts are suspicious.

Option B (Incorrect):Credit card payments are traceableanddo not raise immediate red flags.

Option D (Incorrect):Kimberly Process-certified diamondsare legally sourced, and requesting themdoes not indicate suspicious intent.

According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), financial institutions should apply a risk-based approach to customer due diligence (CDD), which includes obtaining and updating information on the identity, beneficial ownership, and business activities of their clients. If a client refuses to provide or update such information, or provides false or misleading information, the financial institution should consider this as a red flag for potential money laundering or terrorist financing, and should exit the relationship with the client, unless the circumstances warrant otherwise. Exiting the relationship with a client who refuses to update information is also consistent with the FATF’s Recommendation 10, which requires financial institutions to terminate the business relationship if they are unable to perform CDD measures.

 The FATF is an inter-governmental body that sets standards and promotes effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures to combat money laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system1. The FATF identifies jurisdictions with serious strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering / counter financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regimes and issues public statements to warn the international community of the risks emanating from these jurisdictions2. These jurisdictions are also known as high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action, or the “black list” in external sources2. The FATF urges its members and all other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect themselves from the money laundering and terrorist financing risks posed by these jurisdictions2. Counter-measures are enhanced due diligence or restrictive measures that go beyond the normal AML/CFT requirements, such as requiring additional information or documentation, rejecting transactions, restricting business relationships, or terminating correspondent banking relationships3. The FATF also provides guidance on the types and levels of counter-measures that may be appropriate, depending on the specific risks and circumstances of each jurisdiction3.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) by ACAMS, the independent testing of an institution’s anti-money laundering program should be conducted by a person who reports directly to the Board of Directors or a Board Committee. This ensures that the person conducting the testing has the necessary authority, independence, and objectivity to evaluate the program’s adequacy and effectiveness, and to report any findings or recommendations to the senior management1. The person conducting the testing should also have the appropriate knowledge, skills, and experience in the anti-money laundering field, and should be familiar with the institution’s products, services, customers, and risks2.

The other options are not necessarily suitable or qualified to perform the independent testing of an institution’s anti-money laundering program. For example:

A certified specialist in the anti-money laundering field may have the relevant expertise and credentials, but may not have the required independence or reporting line to conduct the testing. For instance, if the certified specialist is an employee of the institution who is involved in the implementation or operation of the anti-money laundering program, then there may be a conflict of interest or a lack of objectivity in the testing process1.

A former anti-money laundering officer from a similar institution may have the relevant experience and background, but may not have the current knowledge or familiarity with the institution’s anti-money laundering program, policies, procedures, or systems. Moreover, the formeranti-money laundering officer may have a personal or professional relationship with the institution or its staff, which may compromise the independence or integrity of the testing process1.

A retired government regulator or federal law enforcement officer may have the relevant authority and credibility, but may not have the specific skills or qualifications to conduct the testing. For instance, the retired regulator or law enforcement officer may not be well-versed in the latest anti-money laundering standards, regulations, or best practices, or may not be able to apply them to the institution’s unique risk profile, products, services, or customers1.

A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) is an agreement between two or more countries for the purpose of gathering andexchanging information in an effort to enforce public or criminal laws1. MLATs provide a legal basis for transmitting evidence that can be used for prosecution and judicial proceedings, such as witness statements, bank records, search and seizure orders, and asset forfeiture2. MLATs also facilitate the cooperation and coordination between law enforcement authorities of different jurisdictions in investigating and prosecuting transnational crimes, such as money laundering, terrorist financing, corruption, and cybercrime3. The other options are incorrect because:

B. MLATs do not receive reports of suspicious transactions from financial institutions, but rather request specific information or evidence from foreign authorities. Financial institutions report suspicious transactions to their domestic Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), which may then share the information with foreign FIUs through other mechanisms, such as the Egmont Group or bilateral agreements4.

C. MLATs do not obtain intelligence that might lead to evidence, but rather request evidence that is already available or can be obtained by foreign authorities. Intelligence is a broader term that refers to any information that is relevant to the security or interests of a country, and may not be admissible as evidence in a court of law5. Intelligence may be obtained through other means, such as covert operations, surveillance, or informants6.

D. MLATs do not issue the Principles of Information Exchange Between Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), but rather follow them. The Principles of Information Exchange are a set of guidelines that were adopted by the Egmont Group of FIUs in 2001, and aim to enhance the cooperation and communication among FIUs in exchanging financial information and intelligence7. The Principles of Information Exchange are not legally binding, but rather reflect the best practices and standards of the FIU community.

According to the ACAMS Study Guide, 6th Edition, page 184, “The decision to close an account should be made in consultation with the institution’s legal counsel and AML compliance officer, and in accordance with the institution’s policies and procedures.” Closing an account may not always be the best option, as it may trigger the customer’s suspicion, interfere with law enforcement investigations, or expose the institution to legal risks. Therefore, the institution should carefully weigh the pros and cons of closing an account, and follow its own internal guidelines.

"The first European Union Directive, “Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering (Directive 91/308/EEC),” was adopted by the Council of the European Communities in June 1991. Like all directives adopted by the Council, it required member states to achieve (by amending national law, if necessary) the specified results. This First Directive required the members to enact legislation to prevent their domestic financial systems from being used for money laundering"

the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has the authority to prohibit or reject any trade or financial transactions involving specified countries, entities, and individuals that are subject to U.S. economic sanctions, unless such transactions are authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC. This applies to transactions that occur within the U.S. territory, as well as transactions that involve U.S. persons, U.S. goods, or the U.S. financial system, regardless of where they take place. This is one of the key aspects of OFAC’s extraterritorial reach, which means that OFAC can enforce its sanctions programs beyond the U.S. borders.

One of the key components of an effective anti-money laundering (AML) program is to implement adequate customer due diligence (CDD) measures for new accounts. This includes verifying the identity of the party opening the account, determining the beneficial owner(s) of the account, and seeking to determine the source of deposited funds. These measures help the financial institution (FI) to understand the nature and purpose of the customer relationship, assess the risk profile of the customer, and detect and report any suspicious or unusual activity. Documenting the identity of the party opening the account and the beneficial owner(s) of the account also helps the FI to comply with the record-keeping and reporting requirements of the AML laws and regulations, and to cooperate with the authorities in case of investigations or inquiries. Seeking to determine the source of deposited funds helps the FI to prevent the introduction of illicit funds into the financial system, and to identify any discrepancies or inconsistencies between the customer’s profile and activity.

The three statements from the procedure that are in line with Wolfsberg are:

B. The responsible private banker must establish the identity of a holder of general powers over an account (e.g. a signatory for the account) and, as appropriate, verify that identity. This is consistent with the Wolfsberg Principle 1.2.1, which states that the bank will establish the identity of its clients and beneficial owners prior to establishing business relationships with such persons1.

D. The responsible private banker must obtain the necessary documentation establishing the authorized signer’s authority to act on behalf of the account holder or beneficial owner (e.g. a Power of Attorney). This is consistent with the Wolfsberg Principle 1.2.3, which states that the bank will obtain the necessary documentation establishing the authority of the authorized signatory to act on behalf of the client or beneficial owner1.

E. If an individual has signing authority over an account but does not act on a professional basis as a manager of funds, the responsible private banker must understand and document the relationship between that authorized signer, the account holder, and, if different, the beneficial owner of the account. This is consistent with the Wolfsberg Principle 1.2.4, which states that the bank will understand and document the relationship between the authorized signatory, the client and, if different, the beneficial owner of the account1.

these are the main factors that determine the inherent money laundering risk of a financial institution. The customer base, location, products and services of a financial institution affect the type, volume, and complexity of transactions that it processes, as well as the exposure to high-risk customers, jurisdictions, and activities12. A financial institution should review these factors regularly and conduct a comprehensive risk assessment to identify, measure, and mitigate its money laundering risk34.

The compliance officer is the person who has the day-to-day responsibility of communicating and reinforcing the established anti-money laundering (AML) compliance culture and program within the organization. The compliance officer is also responsible for overseeing the implementation, maintenance, and improvement of the AML policies, procedures, controls, and training. The compliance officer should have sufficient authority, independence, and resources to perform their duties effectively and report to senior management and the board of directors on the status and effectiveness of the AML program.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, the institution should develop a system to monitor all the activity of the customer’s accounts to mitigate the risk associated with these accounts. This is because the customer’s behavior and profile may indicate some red flags of money laundering, such as:

Operating an import-export business, which is a common sector for trade-based money laundering, where trade transactions are used to disguise the movement of illicit funds, either by over- or under-invoicing, misrepresenting the quantity or quality of goods, or falsifying documents1.

Receiving funds from a jurisdiction perceived as highly corrupt, which may increase the risk of the funds being derived from bribery, embezzlement, fraud, or other predicate offences2. Transparency International is a global civil society organization that publishes an annual CorruptionPerceptions Index, which ranks countries by their perceived levels of public sector corruption based on expert assessments and surveys3.

Making frequent transfers among the accounts, which may indicate a layering technique, where funds are moved through multiple accounts, institutions, or jurisdictions to obscure the audit trail and the source and ownership of the funds4.

Preferring to manage the accounts separately, which may indicate a lack of transparency or an attempt to avoid detection or reporting by the institution.

By developing a system to monitor all the activity of the customer’s accounts, the institution can:

Identify and verify the identity and beneficial ownership of the customer and the parties involved in the transactions.

Obtain and verify information on the nature and purpose of the business relationship and the source and destination of the funds.

Conduct a risk assessment of the customer and the transactions based on the customer’s profile, behavior, and geographic locations.

Apply enhanced due diligence and ongoing monitoring measures for higher-risk customers and transactions, such as obtaining additional information, documentation, or approval, or conducting more frequent or in-depth reviews.

Detect and report any suspicious or unusual transactions or activities to the relevant authorities.

The other three options are incorrect because:

File a suspicious transaction report is not the best answer, as it is a reactive measure that should be taken after the institution has identified or suspected money laundering or terrorist financing activity, not before. The institution should first conduct due diligence and monitoring of the customer and the transactions, and then file a report if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the activity is suspicious or unusual.

Diminish the importance of the subjective Transparency International rating is not the best answer, as it is a complacent and irresponsible attitude that may expose the institution to legal, regulatory, reputational, or operational risks. The Transparency International rating is not subjective, but based on credible sources and methodologies, and it is widely used as a reference by governments, businesses, civil society, and the public to assess the level of corruption in different countries3. The institution should not ignore or downplay the rating, but rather use it as one of the factors to evaluate the risk of the customer and the transactions.

Conduct a trade-price manipulation analysis is not the best answer, as it is a specific and technical measure that may not be sufficient or appropriate to mitigate the risk associated with these accounts. A trade-price manipulation analysis is a method of detecting trade-based money laundering by comparing the prices of goods or services in a transaction with the market prices or other benchmarks, and identifying any significant discrepancies or anomalies. However, this measure may not be feasible or effective if the institution does not have access to reliable and comparable data, or if the goods or services are not standardized or homogeneous. Moreover, this measure may not address other aspects of the risk, such as the identity, ownership, or behavior of the customer and the parties involved in the transactions.

A compliance officer should consider the following three factors as part of the approach to implement an enterprise-wide anti-money laundering program for a bank that operates in multiple countries:

The types of customers serviced by the bank: Different types of customers may pose different levels of money laundering risk, depending on their nature, source of funds, geographic location, transaction patterns, and other factors. A compliance officer should identify and assess the money laundering risk associated with each customer type and segment, and apply appropriate due diligence measures, monitoring systems, and risk mitigation strategies accordingly12.

The extent of anti-money laundering regulations in the various countries: A compliance officer should be aware of the legal and regulatory requirements and expectations for anti-money laundering compliance in each country where the bank operates, and ensure that the bank’s policies and procedures are consistent with them. A compliance officer should also monitor any changes or updates in the anti-money laundering laws and regulations in the various countries, and adjust the bank’s program accordingly34.

The anti-money laundering risk posed by the products and services offered by the bank: Different products and services may have different features and functionalities that could be exploited by money launderers, such as anonymity, cross-border transfers, cash transactions,complex structures, or new technologies. A compliance officer should evaluate the money laundering risk associated with each product and service offered by the bank, and implement appropriate controls, safeguards, and oversight mechanisms to prevent and detect money laundering activities5 .

an employee who avoids taking periodic vacations despite having accrued vacation time may be trying to conceal fraudulent or illegal activities that would be exposed in their absence. This is a common red flag for internal fraud and money laundering, as it indicates a lack of segregation of duties, internal controls, and oversight. Employees who engage in such behavior may also exhibit other signs of stress, defensiveness, or secrecy.

Wash trading is the term for trading through multiple accounts, where an individual generates offsetting profits and losses and transfers of positions through accounts that do not appear to be commonly controlled. Wash trading is a form of market manipulationthat creates artificial trading activity and volume, and may be used to evade taxes, inflate prices, or launder money. Wash trading can also involve the use of third parties or intermediaries to conceal the true identity and source of funds of the trader.

The USA PATRIOT Act, enacted in 2001, is a comprehensive legislation that aims to enhance the US government’s ability to combat terrorism, money laundering, and other criminal activities. One of the aspects of the Act that has extraterritorial reach is the requirement for US financial institutions (FIs) to apply certain due diligence and reporting obligations to their correspondent accounts and private banking accounts for foreign FIs and non-US persons, respectively12. These obligations are intended to prevent foreign FIs and individuals from using the US financial system to facilitate money laundering, terrorist financing, or other illicit activities. The Act also authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to impose special measures, such as recordkeeping, reporting, or prohibitions, on certain foreign jurisdictions, FIs, or transactions that are found to be of primary money laundering concern34. These special measures can have significant impact on the access and operations of foreign FIs and persons in the US financial market.

https://www.wolfsberg-principles.com/sites/default/files/wb/pdfs/wolfsbergstandards/10.%20Wolfsberg-Private-Banking-Prinicples-May-2012.pdf

2.4 Senior Management Approval

The bank's internal policies should indicate whether, for any one or more among these categories, Senior

Management must approve entering into new relationships.

Relationships with Politically Exposed Persons may only be entered into with the approval of Senior Management.

Before sharing customer records within the same jurisdiction, an FI should consider the legal and regulatory framework that governs the protection of personal data and the disclosure of client information. Different jurisdictions may have different laws and rules regarding the privacy and confidentiality of customer data, the consent and notification requirements for data sharing, the purposes and scope of data sharing, and the safeguards and accountability measures for data protection. An FI should ensure that it complies with the applicable restrictions and obligations when sharing customer records within the same jurisdiction, and that it does not violate the rights and expectations of its customers.

According to the Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Principles for Correspondent Banking, one of the key aspects of establishing and maintaining a correspondent relationship is to conduct a risk-based due diligence on the respondent bank, which includes obtaining approval from at least one person other than the person sponsoring the relationship12. This is to ensure that the correspondent bank has a clear understanding of the nature, purpose, and expected activity of the relationship, as well as the respondent bank’s ownership, governance, AML policies, and customer base12.

Another aspect of the Wolfsberg AML Principles is to recognize and assess the factors that may increase the risk inherent in a correspondent relationship, such as the involvement of politically exposed persons (PEPs), the presence of downstream (nested) correspondents, the geographic location of the respondent bank and its customers, and thetypes of products and services offered by the respondent bank12. These factors may require enhanced due diligence, monitoring, and reporting of suspicious activities by thecorrespondent bank, as well as the application of appropriate risk mitigation measures12.

Sanctions screening and transaction monitoring rules are two of the most common controls that FIs use to identify suspicious money-laundering activity. Sanctions screening is the process of checking customers, transactions, and counterparties against various lists of sanctioned individuals, entities, and countries issued by national and international authorities. Sanctions screening helps FIs to avoid doing business with or facilitating the activities of those who are involved in terrorism, proliferation, human rights violations, or other criminal activities. Transaction monitoring rules are the criteria or scenarios that FIs use to detect unusual or potentially suspicious patterns of transactions or behaviors of customers or accounts. Transaction monitoring rules help FIs to identify transactions that deviate from the expected norms, such as large cash deposits, frequent wire transfers, or transactions with high-risk jurisdictions. Transaction monitoring rules also help FIs to comply with their reporting obligations, such as filing Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) or Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs).

Based on the USA PATRIOT Act, one action that the US might take to demonstrate extraterritorial reach is to send requests for information to a non-US based financial institution (FI). The USA PATRIOT Act expanded the authority of the US government to issue subpoenas and other legal orders to foreign banks that maintain a correspondent account in the US, requiring them to produce records relating to such account or any account at the foreign bank, including records maintained outside the US12. This provision was intended to enhance the ability of the US to investigate and prosecute money laundering and terrorist financing activities that involve foreign FIs3.

The compliance officer should perform the first step of reviewing the institution’s risk assessment before implementing any changes to the customer onboarding program. The risk assessment is a key component of the AML compliance program, as it identifies and measures the institution’s exposure to money laundering and terrorist financingrisks. The risk assessment should be updated regularly and reflect the institution’s products, services, customers, geographic locations, and delivery channels. By reviewing the risk assessment, the compliance officer can determine the adequacy and effectiveness of the current customer onboarding program and identify any gaps or weaknesses that need to be addressed. The compliance officer can also benchmark the institution’s risk assessment against the regulatory expectations and best practices in the industry.

The other steps are also important, but they should be performed after the risk assessment review. Revising training materials for frontline staff, conducting enhanced due diligence on high risk customers, and resolving substantive discrepancies in customer verification are all part of the customer onboarding program, but they depend on the risk assessment to provide the appropriate level of controls and procedures. For example, the training materials should reflect the risk assessment results and the revised customer onboarding policies. The enhanced due diligence should be applied to customers who pose a higher risk according to the risk assessment criteria. The customer verification should be consistent with the risk assessment and the customer identification program.

A comprehensive risk analysis is the first and most important step in developing an effective anti-money laundering program. A risk analysis helps a financial institution identify and assess its exposure to money laundering and terrorist financing risks, based on its products, services, customers, geographic locations, and other factors. A risk analysis also enables a financial institution to tailor its policies, procedures, controls, and training to mitigate the specific risks it faces. A risk analysis should be conducted periodically and updated as necessary to reflect changes in the institution’s risk profile.

The Egmont Group is a global network of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) that aims to enhance the capabilities and cooperation of its members in combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes. The Egmont Group supports its FIU members by helping them to expand and systematize the exchange of financial intelligence and information, improve expertise and capabilities of personnel, and enable secure communication with one another12. The Egmont Group does not issue due diligence models for financial institutions, as this is the responsibility of national regulators and standard-setting bodies. The Egmont Group does not issue strategic products for law enforcement agencies and FIUs, as this is the role of other international organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The Egmont Group does not expand the ability of FIUs to enforce laws and exchange information globally, as this depends on the legal and operational frameworks of each FIU and the bilateral or multilateral agreements they have with other FIUs.

Economic sanctions are a tool that governments and multi-national bodies can use to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) by imposing restrictions on trade, financial transactions, travel, or other activities with targeted countries, entities, or individuals that are involved or suspected of being involved in WMD programs. Economic sanctions aim to disrupt the supply chains, funding sources, and incentives for developing or acquiring WMDs, as well as to deter and punish any violations of international norms and obligations regarding WMDs. Economic sanctions can be imposed unilaterally by a country or multilaterally by a group of countries or an international organization, such as the United Nations, the European Union, or the Financial Action Task Force.

 New business products should be evaluated for AML concerns before they are launched into the market. This is because new products may introduce new risks or vulnerabilities that could be exploited by money launderers or terrorist financiers. By conducting a pre-launch assessment, a financial institution can identify and mitigate these risks, design appropriate controls and procedures, and ensure compliance with the relevant laws and regulations. A pre-launch assessment can also help a financial institutionto align its AML strategy with its business objectives, and avoid potential reputational damage or regulatory sanctions.

REPORTING OF SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTIONS [https://www.fatf- gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf] If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should be required, by law, to report promptly its suspicions to the financial intelligence unit (FIU). According to the Financial Action Task Force‘s (FATF) Recommendation 20, a suspicious transaction report (STR) or a suspicious activity report (SAR) is filed by a financial institution or, by a concerned citizen, to the local Financial Intelligence Unit if they have reasonable grounds to believe that a transaction is related to criminal activity. [https://aml-cft.net/library/suspicious-transaction-report-str-suspicious-activity-report-sar/]

As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such individuals and companies are called "Specially Designated Nationals" or "SDNs." Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them. So it's covering all

When implementing a risk-based approach related to casinos, the risks related to the customer as an individual are mainly based on the customer’s profile, behaviour, source of funds, and geographic location. Among the options given, B and D are the most relevant factors that could indicate a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing.

Casual customers are those who do not have a regular or established relationship with the casino, and who may visit the casino only once or occasionally. They may not provide sufficient or reliable identification information, or may use false or stolen identities. They may also engage in suspicious transactions, such as large cash purchases of chips, minimal or no gaming activity, or frequent transfers of chips between customers. Casual customers pose a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing because they are harder to verify, monitor, and trace by the casino operators.

Customer from a high-risk country is a customer who resides in, or has links to, a country that is subject to sanctions, embargoes, or similar measures, or that is identified by credible sources as having significant levels of corruption, or as being a source, transit, or destination of illicit funds. Such customers pose a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing because they may be involved in, or connected to, criminal or terrorist activities, or may be using funds that are derived from or intended for such activities.

According to the FATF Recommendation 10, financial institutions should conduct ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds. This is one of the core measures of customer due diligence (CDD) that aim to prevent and detect money laundering and terrorist financing risks.

According to the FATF Guidance on Private Sector Information Sharing, FIs should establish sufficient safeguards concerning the confidentiality of information shared for AML purposes, both within the same financial group and between FIs not belonging to the same group. These safeguards include ensuring that the information is shared only with authorized personnel who have a need to know, that the information is used only for the intended AML purpose, and that the information is protected from unauthorized access, disclosure, or misuse. FIs should also comply with the applicable legal and regulatory requirements on data protection and privacy, and respect the rights and interests of the customers whose information is shared1.

According to the third European Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing1, Member States may allow the identity verification of the beneficiary under the policy to be carried out at or before the time of payout or before the beneficiary intends to exercise rights vested under the policy, provided that the following conditions are met:

the beneficiary is identified as a natural or legal person or a legal arrangement, and the verification of the identity is not possible earlier, due to the nature of the product or the transaction;

there is a low risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, taking into account the type of policy, the product features, the premium amount, and the distribution channel;

the Member States adopt appropriate risk-sensitive measures to prevent the misuse of the policy during the life of the relationship.

This provision is intended to accommodate the specificities of the life insurance sector, where the beneficiary may not be known at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or may change during the life of the policy. However, the Directive also requires that the identity verification of the beneficiary is carried out as soon as possible after the establishment of the business relationship, and that the insurance undertaking applies enhanced customer due diligence measures when the beneficiary is a politically exposed person.

According to the Anti-Money Laundering Specialist (the 6th edition) resources, the Egmont Group is an international network of FIUs that facilitates and prompts the exchange of information, knowledge, and cooperation among its members to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and associated predicate offences1. The Egmont Group suggests that one of the core objectives that would lead to an effective national FIU is to have absolute trust amongst national and international stakeholders before sensitive information will be exchanged with confidence2. This means that the FIU should establish and maintain a high level of credibility, professionalism, and integrity in its operations, and ensure that the information it receives and disseminates is protected and used appropriately. The FIU should also comply with the Egmont Group’s principlesand standards for information exchange, and foster a culture of mutual trust and cooperation with other FIUs and relevant authorities3.

The other three options are incorrect because:

The FIU must operate from physically separated premises from other law enforcement agencies and government offices is not a core objective that the Egmont Group suggests for an effective national FIU. While the FIU should have operational independence and autonomy, and be free from undue influence or interference, it does not necessarily have to be physically separated from other agencies or offices. The FIU may be located within the judicial, law enforcement, administrative, or hybrid model, depending on the country’s legal and institutional framework4.

The FIU meets the Egmont Group assessment criteria is not a core objective that the Egmont Group suggests for an effective national FIU. While meeting the Egmont Group assessment criteria is a requirement for becoming and remaining a member of the Egmont Group, it is not an objective in itself. The assessment criteria are based on the FATF recommendations and the Egmont Group’s own documents, and they serve as a benchmark for evaluating the FIU’s compliance and effectiveness5.

The FIU must be able to promote the value of the government’s commitment to embed a corruption free society within the country is not a core objective that the Egmont Group suggests for an effective national FIU. While the FIU may contribute to the prevention and detection of corruption, as well as the recovery of illicit assets, by analyzing and sharing financial intelligence, it is not the sole or primary responsibility of the FIU to promote the value of the government’s commitment to embed a corruption free society within the country. This is a broader and more complex goal that involves multiple actors and factors, such as political will, legal framework, institutional capacity, civil society, media, and international cooperation.

Concentration accounts are internal accounts used by financial institutions to aggregate funds from or for various clients or other accounts. They are also known as omnibus accounts or suspense accounts. The use of concentration accounts may obscure the audit trail and the identity of the clients involved in the transactions. Therefore, the Wolfsberg Principles on Private Banking, which are a set of voluntary guidelines for preventing money laundering and terrorist financing in the private banking sector, prohibit the use of concentration accounts in a way that would prevent appropriate monitoring or identification of the clients or their funds12.

The line of business is responsible for creating, implementing and maintaining policies and procedures, as well as communicating these to all personnel. It must also establish processes for screening employees to ensure high ethical and professional standards and deliver appropriate training on AML policies and procedures based on roles and functions performed so employees aware of their responsibilities. To facilitate this, employees should be trained as soon as possible after being hired, with refresher training as appropriate.